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Abstract
The three chapters of this dissertation investigate major puzzles in international eco-
nomics and labor economics. The first chapter investigates the macroeconomic effects of
primary commodities trade flows across countries with different export composition. The
second chapter studies labor flows of workers with similar skill-level and across countries
with similar income. Lastly, the third chapter evaluates the macroeconomic effects of a
health policy in the United States.
Chapter 1 analyzes how the production and price volatility of primary commodities ac-
count for the co-movement between real GDP and terms of trade. Primary commodity
exporter countries face large terms of trade fluctuations, largely driven by primary com-
modity price shocks and amplified by the relative importance of primary commodities in
the countries’ exports. In this chapter, I document that an increase in the price of a pri-
mary commodity is usually followed by a decrease in terms of trade, defined as the relative
price of imports over exports, and an increase in real GDP in these countries. Meanwhile,
countries that do not export primary commodities enjoy more stable terms of trade, and
their real GDP is positively correlated with terms of trade. Although the literature on pri-
mary commodity exporters has focused on developing countries, I show that this relation
is independent of a country’s income level. Since standard models are unable to generate
real aggregate fluctuations from price shocks if real GDP is correctly measured, this paper
identifies a puzzle. I propose a class of mechanisms that is capable of explaining the het-
erogeneous impact of terms of trade fluctuations across countries. I show that a possible
resolution is to incorporate the presence of idle resources and a production cost externality
in the primary commodity producing sector in order to connect terms of trade fluctuations
to real GDP fluctuations. When subjected to a primary commodity price shock, the model
successfully accounts for the behavior of terms of trade and its relation to real GDP for
different export compositions.
Chapter 2, joint work with Maria Jose Rodriguez Garcia and Rocio Madera, revisits em-
pirical evidence on migration within the European Union-15, disaggregated by occupation.
We find that workers move to countries where their type is relatively more abundant among
natives. This is at odds with traditional models of migration. We develop a model with
external economies of scale that generates an agglomeration force in high-educated labor.
Our main result is that a country that is relatively abundant in highly educated labor force
iii
will attract foreign labor of the same type. We argue this type of model is more suitable to
analyze migration flows between countries of similar income level.
Finally, Chapter 3, joint with Juan Carlos Conesa, Parisa Kamali, Timothy Kehoe,
Vegard Nygard, Gajendran Raveendranathan, and Akshar Saxena, develops an overlapping
generations model to study the macroeconomic effects of an unexpected elimination of Medi-
care. We find that a large share of the elderly respond by substituting Medicaid for Medicare.
Consequently, the government saves only 46 cents for every dollar cut in Medicare spending.
We argue that a comparison of steady states is insufficient to evaluate the welfare effects
of the reform. In particular, we find lower ex-ante welfare gains from eliminating Medicare
when we account for the costs of transition. Lastly, we find that a majority of the current
population benefits from the reform but that aggregate welfare, measured as the dollar value
of the sum of wealth equivalent variations, is higher with Medicare.
iv
Contents
Acknowledgements i
Dedication ii
Abstract iii
List of Tables viii
List of Figures x
1 From Primary Commodities to Output Fluctuations 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Primary commodities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Empirical findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Commodity prices and terms of trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3.2 Terms of trade and real GDP comovements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.3 Commodity exports versus developing countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4 Terms of trade and output fluctuations: a puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.1 The benchmark model and the puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.2 Overcoming the Kehoe-Ruhl puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 A model for the primary commodity sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5.1 Primary commodity producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
v
1.5.2 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5.3 The role of idle resources and fixed cost externality . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6 Numerical experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.6.1 Two-country economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.6.2 Small open economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.8 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2 North-North Migration and Agglomeration in the European Union15 33
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.3 Data and Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.1 Data and Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.3.2 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.4 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.4.1 Closed Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4.2 Integrated Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5 Results and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3 Macroeconomic Effects of Medicare 58
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Relation to the literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
3.3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.1 Consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.2 Health insurance and government welfare programs . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3.3 Consumer problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
vi
3.3.4 Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.3.5 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.3.6 Definition of equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4.1 Health expenditure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.4.2 Health insurance parameters and Medicaid eligibility criteria . . . . . 70
3.4.3 Health transition and death probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4.4 Preference, technology, and life cycle parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.4.5 Earnings process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.5.1 Eliminating Medicare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.5.2 Eliminating Medicare and Medicaid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.6 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
References 94
Appendix A. Appendix to Chapter 1 99
Appendix B. Appendix to Chapter 2 105
vii
List of Tables
I Standard deviation of primary commodity price and consumer price index for
selected countries (PCX and the USA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
II Export composition and GNI per capita (average 1990–2015) . . . . . . . . . 23
III Terms of trade and real commodity prices statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
IV Average statistics by country groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
V Coefficients by country groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
VI Preliminary calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
VII Two-country model – variations for a 1% increase in non-PCX productivity . 27
I Share of Natives and Immigrants by Country of Residence . . . . . . . . . . . 41
II Concentration Patterns (1996-2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
III Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
IV Sectoral Output, World GDP and Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
I Insurance parameters determined outside the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
II Non-insurance parameters determined outside the model . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
III Parameters determined jointly in equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
IV Labor earnings distribution (percent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
V Wealth distribution (percent) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
VI Comparative statics: Economy with and without Medicare . . . . . . . . . . . 87
VII Insurance distribution and medical expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
VIII Fiscal implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
viii
IX Ex-post welfare effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
X Medicaid and food stamps enrollment by health in steady state with Medicare
(percent of population) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
XI Comparative statics: Effect of eliminating Medicare under different parame-
terizations of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
A.1 Primary commodities SITC Rev.2 classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
A.2 Analyzed countries with quarterly data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.3 Analyzed countries with annual data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A.1 Summary Statistics Occupations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.2 ISCO-88 Major Groups and Skill Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
ix
List of Figures
1.1 Standard deviation of terms of trade for PCX and non-PCX . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2 Standard deviation of commodity prices and terms of trade for PCX . . . . . 28
1.3 Commodity prices and terms of trade for Australia, Austria, Chile, and Turkey 29
1.4 Correlation between terms of trade and primary commodity prices . . . . . . 30
1.5 Correlation between terms of trade and real GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.6 Correlation between terms of trade and real GDP - SOE model . . . . . . . . 32
2.1 Employment distribution: Percentage (2010) and growth rate (1996-2010) . . 40
2.2 Autarky Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3 Specialization Patterns: Case 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.4 Thresholds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.1 Medical expenses by age and health state (MEPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.2 Medical expense risk by age (MEPS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3 Distribution of medical expenses by age and provider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4 Medicaid enrollment by age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.5 Transition from economy with Medicare to economy without: Aggregates . . 92
3.6 Transition from economy with Medicare to economy without: Ex-ante welfare
on unborn consumer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.7 Percentage of votes in favor of reform by age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.8 Percentage of votes in favor of reform by age and health . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A.1 Standard deviation of terms of trade for PCX and non-PCX . . . . . . . . . . 103
x
A.2 Correlation between terms of trade and real GDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.1 Specialization Patterns: Case 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
xi
Chapter 1
From Primary Commodities to
Output Fluctuations
1
21.1 Introduction
An increase in the international relative price of a primary commodity oftentimes pro-
duces, in a country that exports such a primary commodity, an increase in exports, a decrease
in terms of trade (the relative price of imports to exports), and an increase in real GDP. In
a context of intense international trade, sudden changes in primary commodity prices can
provoke huge economic turmoil. Perhaps the most famous case still remains the large oil
price increases in the 1970s and the sharp economic fluctuations that followed. Nonetheless,
there are plenty of more recent examples that illustrate the heavy price volatility prevailing
in the primary commodity markets. Synchronous to the increasing demand in China and
other emergent economies, the 2000s commodities boom contributed to boost real GDP of
many exporting countries. And, more recently, the 2010s commodities price collapse in the
aftermath of the Great Recession has been causing a slowdown in those economies that not
long ago were booming.
In this paper, I define primary commodities as goods directly extracted from natural
resources that have been minimally processed. According to this definition and the impor-
tance of primary commodities in a country’s export composition, I classify 46 countries into
two categories: (1) primary commodity exporter (henceforth, PCX) countries or (2) non-
PCX countries. I then document consistent differences across these two groups of countries
with respect to primary commodity prices and macroeconomic fundamentals. In particu-
lar, I show that a large part of the variability of the terms of trade in PCX countries is
associated with extreme movements in the price of the most exported primary commodity.
In addition, PCX countries have a negative correlation between terms of trade fluctuations
and real GDP fluctuations. Meanwhile, non-PCX countries have that correlation being pos-
itive and larger the lower the participation of primary commodities in exports. Finally, I
document that both developing and developed PCX countries share these traits, therefore
weakening the hypothesis that the income level of a country is essential on explaining how
well it accommodates a primary commodity shock.
Given these data findings, this paper identifies the following puzzle. The theory tells
us that, from the perspective of a PCX country, the rising of its primary commodity’s
price can be interpreted as the rest of the world attributing more value to its production
and endowments, which means that the rest of the world is willing to offer more goods in
exchange for the same amount of primary commodity. This unambiguously translates into
larger consumption and welfare in the PCX economy. However, standard models predict
that if the amount of goods the PCX is able to produce has not changed, then output at
base-year prices should not see any change either (Kehoe and Ruhl, 2008). Since this is not
3what the data reveal, one concludes that the theory lacks a transmission mechanism from
relative prices to real output.
I then propose a solution for that puzzle by identifying a class of mechanisms that fit into
the standard model and that are capable of generating the observed real GDP fluctuations
when primary commodity prices or the demand for primary commodities change. These
mechanisms are the presence of idle resources in equilibrium and the existence of market
externalities. They have in common the ability to break the envelope theorem, which,
combined with chain-weighted price indexing, is responsible for cancelling out any price effect
in standard models. I provide an example of how each mechanism works separately and then
I explore a model with a combination of these features by incorporating two characteristics
of the primary commodity sector that stand out: i) different input productivities and ii)
large fixed costs for establishing an infrastructure that benefits all producers.
The empirical evidence shows that, when a primary commodity price goes up, inputs
specific to the primary commodity sector that used to be idle become active or the intensity
of extraction sharpens.1 As in David Ricardo’s Theory of Rent, in which land is used accord-
ing to a decreasing fertility schedule, primary commodity producers exploit first the most
productive natural resource input and, as the returns to production increase, incorporate
the marginally less productive inputs into the production process. Provided that there is a
production cost (or a satiation point), there exists an equilibrium where a fraction of the
input will remain idle. Furthermore, the primary sector is highly dependent on a logistic
infrastructure of distribution since it is, in general, located farther from urban centers and
ports. The provision of such infrastructure entails large fixed production costs, which, once
incurred, benefit all other producers in the sector. I then include an externality in that sec-
tor to represent these shared structures. Specifically, I consider that there is a fixed cost for
keeping the primary commodity sector active and that, the more producers in that sector,
the lower the share each individual producer pays out of the total fixed cost.
To illustrate how the model works, consider the following example. Suppose that a wheat
exporter country has a large endowment of land, the natural resource required to produce
wheat. Assume that land is not a homogeneous input, but rather that there is a distribution
of productivities across the land endowment of that country. The productivity differentials
can be interpreted as geographical conditions, rain incidence, soil pH, and so on. To simplify
the intuition, let each productivity characterize a producer, who takes the international
price of wheat as given and decides how much to produce. Assuming a decreasing returns
to scale technology, which is reasonable since, given technology constraints, there is a limit
for acreage yields, each producer has an optimal size that is consistent with her land’s
1See Sant’Anna (2015) and Kellogg (2014) for quantitative studies.
4productivity. In particular, it might be optimal for some producers to remain idle instead
of paying a fixed cost to produce at a low productivity. If international wheat prices go
up, some producers who were formerly idle might now find it profitable to produce, which
increases wheat output, moves labor from other sectors of the economy toward the wheat-
producing sector, and decreases the output of these other sectors. In addition, the entry
of new wheat producers reduces the fixed cost burden for each individual producer, which
further enhances the chances of formerly idle producers becoming active. As a result, the
market value difference between the increase in wheat production and the decrease in other
sectors’ production is positive, so real GDP goes up. When subjected to an increasing
demand for a primary commodity, or equivalently, to a primary commodity price increase,
the model can reproduce the movements of primary commodity exports, terms of trade, and
real GDP of a PCX economy.
This is a relevant outcome because accounting for increases in real GDP that coincide
with price movements alone is challenging. Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) show that standard mod-
els fail to generate first-order effects on real GDP when terms of trade change. They note
that this result is expected for two reasons: first, because in these models, changes in rela-
tive prices do not induce reallocations across goods and sectors that involve nonproductive
activities or capital going idle; and second, because the real GDP measure was constructed
precisely to neutralize relative price changes.
More recently, Llosa (2012) and de Soyres (2016), seeking a theoretical framework to
connect trade and business cycle synchronization, introduced a mechanism that is able
to generate real GDP changes arising from terms of trade fluctuations. They do so by
incorporating love for variety and monopolistic competition in intermediate good markets.
However, these elements allow for real GDP to be affected by foreign shocks by breaking the
link between imports and production, whereas the discrepancies I document between PCX
and non-PCX are on the export side. Moreover, the patterns I document are robust across
a variety of countries with a very diverse import composition.
Numerous papers have been written about primary commodity price shocks and their
impact on PCX economies; see, for example, Blattman et al. (2007), Hausmann et al.
(2007), Fernandez et al. (2015), and Deaton (1999). However, these papers limit the primary
commodity exporting role to developing countries and attribute some of the dynamics of
what happens in the primary commodity sector to this lower development level. Moreover,
the models constructed to analyze a PCX reaction to an increasing demand for a primary
commodity (or its price increase) avoid evaluating real GDP consequences and instead focus
on nominal GDP, tax revenues, economic growth, or welfare.2
2See, for example, Mendoza (1997), Eicher et al. (2008), Gylfason and Zoega (2002), and Lopez-Martin
5Nevertheless, the empirical literature has largely documented real GDP changes in PCX
economies following fluctuations in their primary commodity’s price in the international
markets. Cavalcanti et al. (2015) construct a commodity terms of trade and find that its
appreciation enhances real output per capita, but its volatility exerts a negative impact on
economic growth. Becker and Mauro (2006) document a century of output drops and find
that the most costly ones for emerging economies are associated with terms of trade shocks.
Pfeifer et al. (2012) find that the effects of increased terms of trade uncertainty account
for one-fifth of Chilean output fluctuations. My empirical findings show that developing
and developed PCX share three characteristics: (i) large terms of trade volatility, (ii) large
and abrupt changes in terms of trade tend to follow large and abrupt primary commodity
price changes, and (iii) a negative correlation between terms of trade and real GDP. Mean-
while, developing and developed non-PCX countries display behaviors that contrast with
the three listed above. Finally, my findings also establish that income is not a major de-
terminant of those behaviors when terms of trade and primary commodity prices are taken
into consideration.
This paper documents that a country’s share of primary commodity exports in total
exports is a decisive factor of real GDP and terms of trade volatilities and comovements,
regardless of its income level. Considering the specificities of the primary commodity pro-
duction sector, this paper argues that allowing for idle resources and/or an externality in
such a sector is a route to reconcile theory and data. This paper is organized as follows. In
the next section, I define primary commodities and PCX countries. I then present in section
1.3 the empirical patterns that stand out from the classification of countries as PCX or not.
Section 1.4 presents the puzzle and explains what class of mechanisms is required in order to
overcome that puzzle. Section 1.5 exhibits a model for the primary commodity sector and
explains how it is able to generate the patterns observed in the data using a combination
of the mechanisms identified in Section 1.4. Next, I explain my calibration strategy and
discuss the quantitative results. The last section concludes.
1.2 Primary commodities
For the purpose of assessing the role of primary commodities in the economy, I adopt a
definition of primary commodities inspired by Radetzki’s Handbook of Primary Commodities
in the Global Economy (2008, chap. 1, p. 7). Broadly, I define primary commodities as
“the output from the primary sector, comprising agriculture (including hunting, forestry
and fishing) and mining. These are the activities which supply unprocessed raw materials
et al. (2016).
6of agricultural and mineral origin, along with fuels, electricity and potable water, for use by
other sectors of the economy.” More specifically, 14 divisions, 24 groups, 2 subgroups, and 2
items from the SITC Rev.2 (see Table A.1) comprise my definition of primary commodities.
Upon selecting these divisions and subdivisions, I also take into account the goods level of
processing to ensure that only raw materials with minimum industrial transformation are
considered as primary commodities.3
This definition covers three basic characteristics that I explore later in my model. First,
the production process of primary commodities involves the transformation or extraction
of a natural resource that is located in the country where the production process takes
place. While this may sound obvious, a loose definition would classify steel as a primary
commodity, which any country can easily produce by having access to imported iron and
coal. Second, primary commodities are more often intermediate goods. And third, each
commodity has a unique world price with little to no room for goods differentiation.
Another feature common to most primary commodities is large price volatility. For
example, the standard deviation of all commodities and the energy price index is 35.9,
whereas the standard deviation of the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) is 15.6. Table I
shows that this is true for all countries in a selected subsample and that, for most of them,
the standard deviation of their main exported primary commodity price is also larger than
their respective CPI. Because of the large volatility of primary commodity prices, one also
expects the terms of trade of a commodity exporter country to be more volatile than those
of nonprimary commodity exporters. In the next section, I show that this is indeed the case,
but before that a definition of primary commodity exporter is required.
I consider a country to be a primary commodity exporter (PCX) if its average share
of primary commodity exports in total goods exports is larger than the average of that
statistic among the 48 countries considered throughout the period 1990 to 2015, that is, if
primary commodities constitute more than 22% of the exported goods. Data availability is
the only restriction for the number of countries analyzed in this paper. I use quarterly data
for the years 1990 to 2015 and find a total of 48 countries with a long enough series.4 I
complement this analysis with annual data for 8 countries in order to have more non-PCX
developing countries for a comparison, which are shown separately.5 I restrict the period
analyzed to have roughly the same number of observations for each country because most
3For example, division 04 includes cereals and cereal preparations, and whereas the group with the
description “wheat and meslin, unmilled” is here considered a primary commodity, the one described as
“cereal, flour or starch preparations of fruits or vegetables” is considered an industrialized good.
4Table A.2 in the appendix lists all countries analyzed and the period for which data are available for
each of them.
5While the quarterly data set provides us more observations, the annual one covers a larger number of
countries. Table A.3 in the appendix lists these countries.
7developing countries do not have much data before 1990. In spite of this restriction, the
period considered features a lot of action in the primary commodity markets, notably the
primary commodity price boom of the early 2000s and its subsequent bust that followed the
international recession of the late 2000s.
Given the definition of primary commodities and the definition of a PCX, my sample
consists of 27 non-PCX countries and 14 PCX countries.6 The country with the largest
participation of primary commodities in exports is Australia with an average of 63% of
primary commodities in its exports. Japan has the lowest participation, with a little less
than 1% of primary commodities in its exports. So, although my sample spans a limited
number of countries, it is able to capture a diverse group of countries with respect to export
composition. Table II reports the export share of primary commodities and, to get a sense
of the export concentration at the commodity level, the export share accounted for by each
of the top two commodity exports.
1.3 Empirical findings
In this section, I present the properties of economies with different export compositions
with respect to primary commodities. I focus on three main economic indicators: (i) main
exported primary commodity price, (ii) terms of trade, and (iii) real GDP. The rationale
behind the analysis of these indicators is that changes in relative primary commodity prices
affect production sector decisions by signaling how much more or less profitable it is to sell
a good domestically or abroad or both, how much more or less costly certain inputs become,
and so on. Within the interaction between these signals and decisions dwell the terms of
trade. In the presence of externalities or other market failures, this interaction results in
changes in real GDP. Hence, my analysis focuses on these three indicators in an effort to
capture possible disruptions originating from primary commodity price volatility.
My PCX versus non-PCX classification is highly successful in identifying distinct pat-
terns for each of these two groups of countries. The successes and failures of the model
presented in section 1.5 depend on their ability to account for these patterns.
I follow the convention in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) (hereafter BKK), accord-
ing to which the definition of terms of trade is the relative price of imports to exports. In
the data, it is computed as the ratio of the implicit price deflator for imports to the implicit
price deflator for exports, with deflators computed as the ratios of current-price imports and
exports to base-year-price imports and exports. The series of primary commodities prices,
originally in U.S. dollars, are divided by the quarterly U.S. GDP deflator to arrive at a
6Including the annual data countries, that amounts to 31 non-PCX countries and 18 PCX countries.
8constant dollar measure. All statistics refer to HP-filtered variables, and except for the net
export ratio, all variables are transformed to logarithms before filtering, unless explicitly
mentioned otherwise.
1.3.1 Commodity prices and terms of trade
The goal of this subsection is to measure the quantitative importance of primary com-
modity prices in determining terms of trade. Once I establish this relationship, I will turn
in the next subsection to the quantitative importance of terms of trade in determining real
GDP. I start by reporting in Table III the basic statistics of the logarithms of the relative
prices studied.
As extensively documented in the literature, I find a large volatility and persistence of
these two prices. The average standard deviation of the terms of trade ranges from 0.19
to 0.09, depending on the exporting status of the country group. And, as expected, the
individual commodity prices are more volatile than the terms of trade, with an average
standard deviation ranging from 0.56 to 0.46. PCX countries display larger terms of trade
volatility and tend to specialize in the most volatile primary commodities whose prices are
more volatile.
Many papers have addressed the terms of trade risks faced by developing countries and
how the world prices of the primary commodities they export affect their terms of trade (for
example, see Bidarkota and Crucini, 2000). Below, I show evidence that this relation goes
through for all PCX countries, despite their development level. In contrast, both developing
and developed non-PCX countries face lower terms of trade volatility.
Table I shows that primary commodities display more price fluctuations as compared
to the selected country consumer’s basket of goods prices. The larger the participation
of a primary commodity in a country’s exports, the more one expects its terms of trade
to fluctuate. Similarly, the larger the fluctuations in the exported primary commodity
prices, the larger the fluctuations in terms of trade. Figure 1.1 confirms the first hypothesis
and displays no pattern other than that of export composition, featuring developed and
developing countries with similar levels of primary commodity exports behaving similarly,
with India being the only outlier among the 30 non-PCX countries in my sample. Figure 1.2
confirms the second hypothesis for PCX countries, showing that, in general, a large standard
deviation of the price fluctuations of the main primary commodity exported entails a large
standard deviation of terms of trade fluctuations.
Now that it has been established that terms of trade in PCX countries are more volatile
and have a volatility increasing in the price of the main primary commodity exported, I
9want to analyze how the terms of trade fluctuate compared to commodity price fluctuations.
Figure 1.3 plots the price for the main primary commodity exported against the terms of
trade for Australia, Austria, Chile, and Turkey. Two observations can be made directly from
the figure. First, large and abrupt changes in terms of trade tend to follow large and abrupt
primary commodity price changes for all four countries. So, as expected, fluctuations in the
price of the most exported primary commodity seem to be driving a lot of the terms of trade
fluctuations. The second observation is that, again, I find opposite patterns for PCX and
non-PCX countries. For the PCX countries, Australia and Chile, terms of trade and primary
commodity prices are negatively correlated, whereas for the non-PCX countries, Austria and
Turkey, they are positively correlated.7 Figure 1.4 shows that this pattern holds for most of
the other countries in my sample.
Given this evidence, I conclude that export concentration in primary commodities and
a larger volatility of primary commodity prices are the crucial characteristics to determine
terms of trade volatility.
1.3.2 Terms of trade and real GDP comovements
In this subsection, I document a novel fact relating terms of trade and real GDP where
the major determinant is a country’s export composition.
When a PCX’s main export price goes up, there is a subsequent terms of trade deterio-
ration, and one expects this to be a good period for this PCX’s economic growth. The first
part of this chain has already been documented in the previous subsection; this subsection
documents the second part. I take the correlation between terms of trade and real GDP
and analyze how it changes according to the share of primary commodities exported. Figure
1.5 exhibits the existence of a clear pattern dividing the two country groups. While most
PCX countries benefit from a terms of trade decrease, the opposite happens for non-PCX
countries. This observation is consistent with the expectation outlined in the first sentence
of this paragraph; that is, a PCX’s real GDP increases when its terms of trade appreciate
(i.e., decrease).
This negative relationship between the correlation of terms of trade and real GDP and the
share of primary commodities exported is robust for different time frames and for different
7Backus and Crucini (2000) document a similar relationship for net oil exporters and importers. They
find that “the most dramatic shifts in the terms of trade are synchronous with changes in the relative price
of oil” (Backus and Crucini, 2000, p. 190) and that Canada, a net oil exporter, has a negative correlation
between oil price and terms of trade, whereas the United States, a net oil importer, has a positive one. The
pattern I document here, however, holds for the main exported primary commodity, and it is surprising
even for a non-PCX country that its terms of trade increase when the price of its main primary commodity
increases.
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measures of terms of trade and real GDP innovations.8
Comparing Figures 1.4 and 1.5 gives us an idea about the strength of the relationship
between commodity prices, terms of trade, and real GDP when the export composition of
a country is considered. Finally, the first three columns of Table IV summarize the facts
discussed in this subsection and the previous subsection.
1.3.3 Commodity exports versus developing countries
The production and export of primary commodities have been historically associated
with developing countries, especially those with a colonial past, when they used to supply
these commodities to the colonial powers in exchange for manufactured goods. To address
the natural question of whether the true pattern arises from the developing versus devel-
oped dimension, I first compare the average statistics calculated for the PCX and non-PCX
countries with those for the developing and developed countries.
I consider a country to be developed if it satisfies the World Bank criterion for being a
high-income country, that is, a GNI per capita of US$12, 616 or more, on average, during the
period 1990 to 2015. My sample has 14 PCX countries, 6 of which are developed countries
and the remaining 8 developing, so there is a fair balance in this regard. With respect to
non-PCX countries, my sample has 12 developing countries and 17 developed, so again both
groups are fairly represented (see column 6 of Table II).
Table IV shows that the average standard deviation of terms of trade for PCX countries
is twice as large as that for non-PCX countries and that, while developing countries display
a larger terms of trade volatility than developed countries, their terms of trade volatility is
still below that of PCX countries. The real GDP volatility is larger for PCX countries, but
also larger for developing countries than for developed countries of either PCX or non-PCX
group. And, finally, the negative correlation between terms of trade and real GDP seems
to be mostly driven by the export composition. I interpret these findings as evidence that
income and development are not the main causes of the contrasting patterns documented in
the last two subsections; rather the importance of primary commodities in overall exports is
of utmost importance when analyzing aggregate fluctuations and their responsiveness with
respect to terms of trade fluctuations.
I also sort countries into four mutually exclusive groups with respect to being a PCX
country or not and being a developed country or not. Consider the following regression in
8For earlier periods, the number of countries remaining in the sample is smaller, but the relationship
is still robust. The alternative measure of innovations is the first difference in logs. These alternative
specifications are available upon request.
11
which real GDP is the dependent variable, terms of trade is the independent variable, and
i indexes a country:
gdpi,t = α0 +
48∑
i=1
4∑
j=1
αjDi,jToTi,t + εt,
where Di,j is a dummy variable corresponding to the following mutually exclusive categories:
(1) developed and non-PCX countries; (2) developed and PCX countries; (3) developing and
PCX countries; and (4) developing and non-PCX countries.
Table V displays the results of this regression. These coefficients serve as an alternative
measure of the average correlation between terms of trade and real GDP for each group of
countries. If the main driver behind the negative correlation is indeed the export composition
instead of the income level, the coefficients must be significantly negative for the PCX groups
and positive for the non-PCX groups. Coefficients are statistically significant at the 10%
level of significance, with the exception of the coefficient for developing non-PCX countries.
For primary commodity exporters, the coefficients are −0.048 for developed countries and
−0.069 for developing countries. The coefficient for developed non-PCX countries is 0.181.
These results corroborate the conjecture that export composition is a better predictor of
the sign of the correlation between terms of trade and real GDP than the income level of
a country. In the next section, I demonstrate why standard models fail to generate this
relation and then provide a new theoretical framework that can successfully account for it.
1.4 Terms of trade and output fluctuations: a puzzle
Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) show that, in a frictionless standard model, changes in terms of
trade do not carry onto real GDP in an economy that imports intermediate goods and exports
final goods. In this section, I show that their model can be adapted to an environment of
a primary commodity exporting economy and that the same argument for the invariance
of real GDP holds. In order to simplify the exposition, I will consider the simplest open
economy environment presented in Kehoe and Ruhl (2008), but similar results extend to all
cases considered by them.
1.4.1 The benchmark model and the puzzle
Consider an open economy where there are three tradable goods: (i) a domestic final
good, (ii) a foreign final good, and (iii) an intermediate good that represents the primary
commodity.9 There is also a nontradable good that serves as an input to the production of
9Notice that this economy has an extra good, the foreign final good, than the economy of Kehoe and
Ruhl (2008). The reason for this inclusion is that here I focus on the exporting effects side, while the original
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primary commodities and will be referred to as natural resources. All markets are perfectly
competitive and can be represented by a representative agent.
Following my definition of primary commodities, I assume primary commodities serve as
inputs to the production of final goods and have a unique world price that is more volatile
than the overall price level of the economy. Assume the production in this sector takes
natural resources and labor as inputs according to the production function
yc,t = f(`c,t, Nt), (1.1)
where f has constant returns to scale, is concave, and is continuously differentiable.
For the PCX economy, the output of the primary commodity sector is only partially
consumed as an input in the production of domestic final goods, cct , and the rest is exported.10
Let the maximization problem of domestic final good producers be
max
cct ,`d,t
pd,tyd,t − pc,tcct − wt`d,t
s.t. yd,t ≤ F (cct , `d,t),
(1.2)
where F (cct , `d,t) = Ad,t(cct)α`
1−α
d,t .
Consumers have fixed endowments L¯ of labor and N¯ of natural resources, which they
supply inelastically. They consume the following basket of goods:
Ct =
(
ωc
σ−1
σ
d,t + (1− ω) c
σ−1
σ
f,t
) σ
σ−1
, (1.3)
where cd,t is the consumption of the domestic final good, cf,t is the consumption of the foreign
final good, ω is a home bias parameter, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods. As in Armington (1969), I assume that goods produced in
different countries are intrinsically different goods, yet substitutable for each other to some
extent. Consumers’ budget constraint is
pd,tcd,t + pf,tcf,t ≤ wtL¯+ rtN¯ , (1.4)
where rt is the rental rate households charge from primary commodity producers for the
services of natural resources.
model focuses on the importing effects. Nonetheless, for trade to take place the economy being studied must
import some good from the rest of the world. For simplicity, I assume it to be a final good.
10Depending on the parameters chosen, the economy can easily become a net importer of primary com-
modities, instead of a net exporter.
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Lastly, the condition for balanced trade is
pd,t (yd,t − cd,t) + pc,t (yc,t − cct) = pf,tcf,t. (1.5)
This specification bears a close resemblance to Kehoe and Ruhl’s (2008) framework,
where it is easy to demonstrate that a change in the relative price of exported inputs has
no impact, up to a first order approximation, on real GDP using a simple envelope theorem
argument. On the expenditure side, real GDP, is
RGDPt = pc,0cc,t + pf,0cf,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
+ pd,0 (yd,t − cd,t) + pc,0 (yc,t − cct)︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
− pf,0cf,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
, (1.6)
where pk,0, k ∈ {d, c, f}, are base-year prices. And, on the output side, real GDP is calcu-
lated as the base period value of gross output minus the base period value of intermediate
inputs, that is
RGDPt = pd,0yd,t + pc,0 (yc,t − cct)
= pd,0F (c
c
t , `d,t) + pc,0
(
f(`c,t, N¯)− cct
)
.
(1.7)
Normalizing the price of the domestic final good to 1, the derivative of real GDP with
respect to the primary commodity price is:
∂RGDPt
∂pc,t
=
[
Fm(c
c
t , `d,t)
∂cct
∂pc,t
+ F (cct , `d,t)
∂`d,t
∂pc,t
]
+ pc,0
(
f ′(`c,t, N¯)
∂`c,t
∂pc,t
− ∂c
c
t
∂pc,t
)
. (1.8)
Using the first order conditions from the producers problems and the labor and natural
resources markets feasibility constraints
∂RGDPt
∂pc,t
= (pc,t − pc,0) ∂c
c
t
∂pc,t
+
(
pc,0
pc,t
− 1
)
wt
∂`c,t
∂pc,t
, (1.9)
and with a chain weighted construction of real GDP, we have:
∂RGDPt
∂pc,t
≈ 0. (1.10)
This is the same result Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) find for an open economy that imports
inputs. The intuition behind the invariance of real GDP is that, when the relative price of
the primary commodity rises, the country decides to export more of the primary commodity
and, hence, to produce less of the domestic final good. The reallocation that takes place
is such that the gains from producing more in one sector are exactly offset by the losses of
producing less in the other sector. This counterbalance of forces follows from the FOCs and
14
the envelope theorem.
1.4.2 Overcoming the Kehoe-Ruhl puzzle
An obvious solution to reconcile data and theory in this framework is to consider a model
that breaks with the envelope condition, generating an extra term in Equation (1.9). Here,
I discuss two mechanisms that fulfill this requirement and provide simple examples.
Idle resources
As shown by Kehoe and Ruhl (2008), if individuals value leisure, the right hand side of
Equation (1.10) would not be zero. The inconvenience of considering an elastic labor supply
is that, for standard utility functions, the sign of that derivative would always go against
the empirical evidence, and the puzzle would persist in a worsened degree. Nonetheless,
understanding the variable labor supply case provides an insight.
The crucial reason for the response of the labor supply to a change in terms of trade
to pass along real GDP is that leisure is not accounted for in real GDP. According to the
intratemporal first order condition of the consumers, some of the time endowment, L¯, will be
devoted for leisure activities. Since real GDP only measures the makes of productive hours,
it follows that a fraction of the productive resources of that economy is not accounted for in
real GDP. When the incentives for working change, for instance, as a consequence of changes
in terms of trade, households adjust their labor supply subsequently changing real GDP.
There are two observations worth mentioning about this. First, notice that agents are
optimally operating in the margin and, as a result, their leisure has a marginal value as well,
its hour marginal value equals that of working an extra hour, and their leisure time produces
something – utility. However, the utility level of agents in the economy is not considered as
part of the real GDP, which bring us to the second observation. An alternative measure of
output that takes the “production” of utility into consideration would bring us back to the
Kehoe-Ruhl puzzle. In that case, any increase of physical output derived from an increase
in the labor supply would be offset by an equal decrease in the utility level.
Provided that the measure of real GDP does not change to incorporate utility, leisure
is then regarded as an idle resource. Having this in mind, the possibility of idle resources
in a different input context might help us solve our conundrum. For example, consider an
economy identical to the one exposed above, except for the consumers side. Assume that
consumers value idle natural resources as a source of sightseeing, better environmental qual-
ity, protection to endangered species, and so on. Hence, instead of maximizing consumption
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alone, they maximize a utility function u(C,N) according to
max
Ct,Nt
u(Ct, Nt)
s.t. PtCt ≤ wtL¯+ rtNt
Nt ≤ N¯ ,
(1.11)
where Pt is the consumer price index corresponding to the basket of goods Ct defined in
Equation (1.3). The inclusion of natural resources as a source of utility represents a com-
peting use for it other than the production of primary commodities. Most importantly, as
discussed in the elastic labor supply case, this alternative use does not weigh into real GDP.
In this case, Equations (1.7)–(1.10) become:
RGDPt = pd,0F (c
c
t , `d,t) + pc,0 (f(`c,t, Nt)− cct) , (1.12)
∂RGDPt
∂pc,t
=
[
Fm(c
c
t , `d,t)
∂cct
∂pc,t
+ F (cct , `d,t)
∂`d,t
∂pc,t
]
+ pc,0
(
f`(`c,t, Nt)
∂`c,t
∂pc,t
− ∂c
c
t
∂pc,t
)
+ pc,0fN (`c,t, Nt)
∂Nt
∂pc,t
= (pc,t − pc,0) ∂c
c
t
∂pc,t
+
(
pc,0
pc,t
− 1
)
wt
∂`c,t
∂pc,t
+ pc,0
rt
pc,t
∂Nt
∂pc,t
≈ rt ∂Nt
∂pc,t
.
(1.13)
Notice that the right hand side of Equation (1.13) no longer cancels out. Therefore,
depending on how idle resources is incorporated into the model, it is capable of overcoming
the Kehoe-Ruhl puzzle for the case of primary commodity exports.
Nevertheless, the case of idle natural resources in the utility function is more useful as an
instructive example of how a mechanism works than as a model suitable for a quantitative
analysis. Apart from the difficulty concerning the identification of the functional form of
u and its parameters with respect to individuals’ preferences for idle natural resources,
the hypothesis of natural resources in the utility function as the sole culprit for all the
fluctuations observed in the data is farfetched at best. On that note, I now discuss the
mechanics of a different ingredient and, in Section 1.5, I explore again the contribution of
idle resources to the resolution of the puzzle under different assumptions.
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Externalities
In this subsection, I allow for an externality in the primary commodity sector. Consider
the benchmark model with the following modification. Assume total factor productivity in
the primary commodity sector is increasing with the output of that sector, but that primary
commodity producers do not internalize it. In this case, the new production function of
primary commodities is
yc,t = A(Yc,t)f(`c,t, Nt), (1.14)
where f has constant returns to scale, is concave, and is continuously differentiable and
A(·) is a continuously differentiable function increasing in Yc,t, the total output in the pri-
mary commodity sector. Notice that Yc,t = yc,t because primary commodity producers are
homogeneous, thus one can still think of a representative primary commodity producer.
Rewriting real GDP on the output side
RGDPt =pd,0F (c
c
t , `d,t) + pc,0 [A(Yc,t)f(`c,t, Nt)− cct ]
pd,0F (c
c
t , `d,t) + pc,0
[
A(f(`c,t, Nt))f(`c,t, N¯t)− cct
]
,
(1.15)
where I substituted for the market clearing condition for natural resources. In this case, the
derivative of real GDP with respect to the primary commodity price is
∂RGDPt
∂pc,t
=
[
Fm(c
c
t , `d,t)
∂cct
∂pc,t
+ F (cct , `d,t)
∂`d,t
∂pc,t
]
+ pc,0
(
A(Yc,t)f`(`c,t, N¯t)
∂`c,t
∂pc,t
− ∂c
c
t
∂pc,t
)
+ pc,0A
′(Yc,t)f`(`c,t, N¯t)
∂`c,t
∂pc,t
f(`c,t, N¯t)
= (pc,t − pc,0) ∂c
c
t
∂pc,t
+
(
pc,0
pc,t
− 1
)
wt
∂`c,t
∂pc,t
+ pc,0A
′(Yc,t)f`(`c,t, N¯t)
∂`c,t
∂pc,t
f(`c,t, N¯t)
≈pc,0A′(Yc,t)f`(`c,t, N¯t)∂`c,t
∂pc,t
f(`c,t, N¯t).
(1.16)
Again, the derivative of real GDP with respect to the primary commodity price is non-
zero, that is, the right hand side of Equation (1.16) does not cancel out. Therefore, ex-
ternalities are another ingredient that can be added to the benchmark model such that it
overcomes the Kehoe-Ruhl puzzle for the case of primary commodity exports.
This example, although didactic, is controversial. There is no consensus on the literature
on whether total factor productivity in the primary commodity sector increases or decreases
when the output of that sector increases. So, once more, I expose this example more as a clear
illustration on how the type of mechanism required after works than a true representation
of the primary commodity sector. Next, I combine the two ingredients, idle resources and
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externalities, into a model for the primary commodity sector whose assumptions are more
realistic.
1.5 A model for the primary commodity sector
In this section, I first develop a two-country model in which one country produces and
exports primary commodities while the other imports them, and I show that these countries
behave as a PCX and a non-PCX, respectively. Then, to account for primary commodity
price taking behavior, I present the small open economy version of the first model, which,
depending on the calibration, delivers the features of a PCX or a non-PCX as documented in
the empirical analysis. The environment is the same as in Section 1.4, except for the primary
commodity sector, as will be clear below. Short of the presence of a primary commodity
producing sector and different parameterization, the environments of both countries are
symmetric, so I describe the environment for only one country.
1.5.1 Primary commodity producers
Beyond the characteristics documented in Section 1.4, I assume that each economy is
endowed with an endowment N of natural resources distributed among a measure 1 of
producers with a continuum of heterogeneous productivities. This assumption entails the
fact that natural resources are both unevenly distributed across countries and have differ-
ent properties that interfere in the efficiency of the production process. For example, in
agriculture, natural resources represent arable land, and the continuum of productivities
corresponds to rain conditions, soil pH, presence of organic matter, and so on. Countries
can vary along both dimensions, the quantity and productivity of natural resources. Let A˜j
denote the productivity of the jth primary commodity producer. For simplicity, let N be
a fixed factor that cannot be transferred across producers. I then simplify the notation by
combining it with the productivity, that is, Aj = A˜jN1−γ . Assume Aj ∼ U [Amin, Amax].
The technology to produce primary commodities is a decreasing returns to scale produc-
tion function that takes labor as an input. That implies the existence of an optimal size for
each primary commodity producer. Lastly, there is a fixed production cost in terms of labor
units that is subject to an externality on the measure of active producers in this sector.
Producer j’s maximization problem is
max
`j
pcyj − w
(
`j +
f
µ
)
s.t. yj ≤ Ajf(`j),
(1.17)
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where µ is the measure of active primary commodity producers and f has decreasing returns
to scale, is concave, and is continuously differentiable. Later, I analyze the case where f is
a fixed proportions production function. Notice that more active producers mean a lower
fixed cost for each individual producer. This positive externality captures the existence of
agglomeration cost effects in the primary commodity sector, that is, large production costs
that are shared among producers. I interpret these shared production costs as the provision
of nonexcludable production structures required for the production of primary commodities,
for instance, roads, ports, and R&D and associated changes in inputs (seeds, livestock,
pesticides), among others.
Given prices and wages, primary commodity producers will be active if profits are non-
negative and idle otherwise, so there is a threshold productivity, A¯, above which production
is positive. This cutoff rule implies that it is optimal, in equilibrium, to have idle natural
resources in this economy, that is, potential primary commodity producers that opt out of
the market.
From A¯, one derives the measure of active producers, µ, and obtains the total production
and total profits in the primary commodity sector as follows:
yc =
∫ Amax
A¯
Ajf(`j)φ (dAj) (1.18)
pic = pcyc − w
∫ Amax
A¯
(
`j +
f
µ
)
φ (dAj) , (1.19)
where φ denotes the uniform distribution of Aj .
1.5.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium for the two-country model is consumption plans {cd, cf} and
{
c?d, c
?
f
}
,
final good production plans {yd,m, `d} and {yf ,mf , `f}, a primary commodity production
plan {yj , `j}, a productivity threshold for the primary commodity sector, A¯, a measure µ of
active primary commodity producers, and prices {pc, pd, pf , w, w?} such that:
1. Given prices, consumption plans maximize (1.3) subject to the appropriate budget
constraint
pdcd + pfcf ≤ wL¯+ pic (1.20)
pdc
?
d + pfc
?
f ≤ w?L¯?. (1.21)
2. Given prices, final good production plans solve (1.2).
19
3. Given prices, the primary commodity production plan solves (1.17).
4. Given prices, A¯ is such that
pcA¯f(`j)− w
(
`j +
f
µ
)
= 0, (1.22)
and µ is given by
µ =
Amax − A¯
Amax −Amin . (1.23)
5. Final goods markets clear:
cd + c
?
d = yd = F (m, `d) (1.24)
cf + c
?
f = yf = F (m
?, `f ). (1.25)
6. The primary commodity market clears:
m+m? = yc =
∫ Amax
A¯
Ajf(`j)φ (dAj) . (1.26)
7. Labor markets clear: ∫ Amax
A¯
(
`j +
f
µ
)
φ (dAj) + `d ≤ L¯ (1.27)
`f ≤ L¯?. (1.28)
1.5.3 The role of idle resources and fixed cost externality
Before examining the results, let’s consider an alternative specification of the primary
commodity sector. First, assume all producers are equally productive, which is equivalent
of having one representative producer. In that case, the measure of active ‘firms’ is always
a degenerate measure that takes either the value 1, in case profits are nonnegative, and
0, otherwise. As a consequence, the fixed cost externality does not play any role because
the representative producer either incurs the whole fixed cost either pays (and produces)
nothing.
This specification brings us back to Section 1.4. To see that, note that since all primary
commodity producer j’s productivities are equal, say Ac, we have a unique representative
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producer problem in that sector:11
max
`c
pcyc − w (`c + f)
s.t. yc ≤ Ac`γc .
(1.29)
We can write a country’s real GDP as follows:
RGDPt = pd,0yd,t + pc,0 (yc,t − cct)
= pd,0F (m, `d) + pc,0 (f(`c)− cct) ,
(1.30)
notice that its derivative with respect to the primary commodity price assumes the same
form as in section 1.4, that is
∂RGDPt
∂pc,t
= pd,0
[
Fm(m, `d)
∂cct
∂pc,t
+ F (m, `d)
∂`d,t
∂pc,t
]
+ pc,0
(
f ′(`c)
∂`c,t
∂pc,t
− ∂c
c
t
∂pc,t
)
. (1.31)
Without the productivity differentials (and the subsequent existence of idle resources
in equilibrium) and the fixed cost externality, this specification collapses to the same one
as in Section 1.4. In this case, terms of trade nor primary commodity prices affect output
and the data evidence remains unexplained. Under the model specification of the previous
subsection, the productivity differentials induce the existence of idle resources, thus creating
an extra term in Equation (1.31) relative to the new mass of primary commodity producers.
Furthermore, the new measure of active producers in that sector changes the fixed production
cost to be payed by each producer, changing the marginal conditions for all producers in the
sector. As a result, the gains from reallocating labor input to that sector are not completely
offset by the reduction of final good production.
1.6 Numerical experiment
In the remaining of the paper, I perform a numerical experiment to investigate the
model’s ability to reproduce the patterns in the data. For the calibration, I use moments
relative to the Australian economy using data from the Australian Bureau of Statistic (ABS).
The home bias in consumption parameter, ω, is fixed at 0.7 to match the share of
domestic goods on private consumption. I take σ from the literature to be 2 (see Ruhl,
2008). I normalize the productivity in the domestic sector, Ad, to 1 and set that of the most
11Without loss of generality, assume the parameters of the economy are such that the primary commodity
sector is always active. Notice that, since all producers are the same, this is equivalent to an economy where
there is no idle resources.
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productive primary commodity producer, Amax, to be so that the ratio Amax/Ad is equal to
the observed ratio of the labor productivities of the primary sector over the whole economy,
both measured in nominal gross value added per hour worked in the respective sector. Table
VI presents the values of the parameters for both the two-country and the SOE cases.
1.6.1 Two-country economy
I perform steady state comparisons for the two-country economy model following a 1%
increase in the non-PCX country productivity. A productivity increase in final sector of the
non-PCX country is expected to increase the demand for commodity inputs in that sector,
driving up the international equilibrium price of the primary commodity. In the PCX
economy, this higher relative price of commodity induces, on one hand, a larger production
of primary commodities and, on the other hand, a lower demand for commodity inputs by
the domestic final sector. As a result, the PCX expands its exports of primary commodity
and its output in the primary sector, while contracting its output in the final sector. Within
my framework, the possibility of incorporation of former idle natural resources and the lower
fixed cost burden in the primary commodity sector allows real GDP to increase.
Table VII summarizes the findings.
1.6.2 Small open economy
I consider a SOE otherwise similar to the PCX economy calibrated above. I use the au-
tocorrelation and the standard deviation of the price of Australian main primary commodity
export, coal, and simulate 1000 price shocks for a sequence of economies with different pri-
mary sector productivities. The benchmark case is still that with the ratio Amax/Ad equal to
the observed ratio of the labor productivities of the primary sector over the whole economy.
Then I allow Amax to vary around that observed ratio at increments of 0.1 to check how
the correlation between terms of trade and real GDP interact with the share of primary
commodity exports in total exports.
Figure 1.6 illustrates the results for this sequence of economies. Despite the fact that
this result emanates from a preliminary calibration, that is, I did not match each country
specifically besides Australia, the model does a good job mimicking the negative relation
seem in Figure 1.5. The correlation for the economy that corresponds to the Australian
productivity ratio is equal to −0.26, while its share of primary commodity exports in total
exports is 87%.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I define primary commodities as goods directly extracted from natural
resources that have been minimally processed. According to this definition and the share
of primary commodities in a country’s export composition, I classify 46 countries into ei-
ther primary commodity exporter (PCX) or non-PCX countries. Using quarterly data for
the period 1990 to 2015, I find that each group of countries displays a particular behavior
in the business cycles with respect to primary commodity prices and macroeconomic fun-
damentals. Additionally, the relations found are strengthened with an increasing share of
primary commodities in total exports for PCX countries and a decreasing share for non-PCX
countries.
In particular, the larger that share is for a PCX country, the more negative is the
correlation between its terms of trade fluctuations and its most exported primary commodity
price fluctuations. The same holds for the correlation between terms of trade fluctuations
and real GDP fluctuations. In contrast, non-PCX countries display the opposite pattern.
Furthermore, I show that both developed and developing PCX countries display the same
patterns whereas much of the existing literature on primary commodities and terms of trade
focuses on developing countries, particularly motivated by the fact that developing economies
have historically performed the role of colonial providers of primary commodities.
Since standard models are unable to generate real aggregate fluctuations from price
shocks if real GDP is correctly measured, this paper identifies a puzzle. I then propose
a class of mechanisms that is capable of explaining the heterogeneous impact of terms of
trade fluctuations across countries. I exemplify how this class of mechanisms works with
two ingredients to be incorporated in the standard model, idle resources and externalities.
As the empirical evidence suggests that any theoretical attempt to understand the fluc-
tuations in PCX countries must incorporate features of the primary commodity sector, I
explore two of these features that stand out: i) natural resources with different productivity
levels and ii) large fixed costs for establishing an infrastructure that benefits all producers. I
map each of these characteristics into one of the ingredients above, and then I build a model
that successfully accounts for the behavior of terms of trade and its relation to real GDP
for different export compositions.
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Table I: Standard deviation of primary commodity price and consumer price index
for selected countries (PCX and the USA)
Country Main exported commodity std(Pcommodity) std(CPI)
ARG Soybean meal 33.37 52.65
AUS Coal, coke and briquettes 32.02 16.89
BRA Iron ore and concentrates 36.95 30.11
CAN Crude petroleum and oils 42.85 12.85
CHL Copper 34.65 25.89
COL Crude petroleum and oils 42.85 18.98
CRI Bananas 27.58 37.48
DNK Meat of swine, fresh, chilled, or frozen 28.83 13.42
GRC Olive oil 26.82 22.21
IDN Crude petroleum and oils 42.85 39.35
ISL Fish, crustaceans, mollucs, preparations 28.79 24.53
MAR Fish, crustaceans, mollucs, preparations 28.79 13.03
NOR Crude petroleum and oils 42.85 13.33
NZL Dairy products and birds’ eggs 28.83 14.45
USA Vegetables and fruit 24.71 15.60
ZAF Coal, coke and briquettes 32.02 32.03
All commodities and energy 35.94
Note: For Argentina, the producer price index was used instead of the consumer price index.
For Chile, the wholesale price index was spliced in with the consumer price index for the
missing years. For the United States, the commodity price corresponds to an index of prices
of “food” commodities.
Table II: Export composition and GNI per capita (average 1990–2015)
% commodities in exports GNI per capita
Code Country All First Second (current US$)
ARG Argentina 58.2 11.4 8.1 7,449
AUS Australia 63.0 13.5 10.1 32,275
AUT Austria 5.4 1.1 0.7 35,272
BEL Belgium 8.2 2.0 1.1 33,787
BRA Brazil 41.3 7.6 5.0 5,772
CAN Canada 22.2 8.1 1.7 31,789
CHE Switzerland 7.3 4.5 1.8 56,628
CHL Chile 43.0 16.8 8.7 7,269
COL Colombia 61.8 25.2 10.3 3,560
CRI Costa Rica 41.2 11.1 7.0 5,114
CZE Czech Republic 6.6 1.5 0.8 11,270
DEU Germany 4.5 0.8 0.6 33,927
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Table II: (continued)
% commodities in exports GNI per capita
Code Country All First Second (current US$)
DNK Denmark 24.0 6.8 3.8 43,276
ESP Spain 14.4 6.7 1.3 21,774
EST Estonia 14.0 2.2 2.1 12,116
FIN Finland 3.4 0.7 0.6 34,721
FRA France 10.2 1.4 1.2 32,135
GBR United Kingdom 10.3 4.9 1.5 32,025
GRC Greece 25.8 2.8 2.5 17,984
HKG Hong Kong 21.1 19.3 0.7 27,879
HUN Hungary 10.6 2.8 1.9 8,639
IDN Indonesia 35.6 10.1 5.45 1,543
IND India 16.9 2.3 5.4 763
IRL Ireland 8.9 3.4 2.1 31,640
ISL Iceland 60.0 53.4 5.1 36,614
ISR Israel 5.0 2.5 0.9 21,509
ITA Italy 5.3 1.9 0.5 27,686
JPN Japan 1.0 0.3 0.2 37,330
KOR South Korea 2.6 1.0 0.8 16,018
LTU Lithuania 17.0 3.7 2.1 8,823
LUX Luxembourg 7.1 2.3 1.1 54,621
LVA Latvia 18.5 4.0 3.0 9,612
MAR Morocco 31.6 10.8 9.3 1,975
MEX Mexico 19.2 12.3 2.8 6,760
NLD Netherlands 15.5 3.3 2.6 37,030
NOR Norway 48.0 38.2 6.2 57,953
NZL New Zealand 38.6 19.3 14.1 22,308
PHL Philippines 12.4 2.9 2.3 1,715
POL Poland 14.1 4.0 2.5 7,629
PRT Portugal 7.8 1.4 0.05 15,565
SGP Singapore 2.3 0.3 0.3 30,587
SVK Slovakia 4.5 0.5 0.4 11,306
SVN Slovenia 5.5 1.3 0.07 18,237
SWE Sweden 4.4 0.9 0.9 40,739
25
Table II: (continued)
% commodities in exports GNI per capita
Code Country All First Second (current US$)
THA Thailand 20.5 5.8 3.4 3,179
TUR Turkey 15.0 7.2 1.4 5,886
USA United States 12.2 1.2 1.1 39,799
ZAF South Africa 25.6 6.4 3.6 4,640
Average 21.3 8.0 3.9 20,411
Table III: Terms of trade and real commodity prices
statistics
Group of countries
Statistic PCX Non-PCX All countries
Panel A: Terms of trade (log)
St. dev. 0.1902 0.0910 0.1399
Mean 4.6893 4.6107 4.6386
ρ 0.9521 0.8751 0.9420
st(ρ) (0.0083) (0.0094) (0.0052)
R2 0.9596 0.9105 0.9452
Observations 1442 2622 4064
Panel B: Commodity prices (log)
St. dev. 0.5607 0.4672 0.5103
Mean 4.2164 4.4010 4.3350
ρ 0.9288 0.9563 0.9453
st(ρ) (0.0100) (0.0057) (0.0051)
R2 0.9643 0.9797 0.9727
Observations 1442 2590 4032
Note: The estimating equation for the persistence param-
eter is pt = µ+ γt+ ρpt−1 + t.
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Table IV: Average statistics by country groups
Group of countries
Statistic PCX Non-PCX Developing Developed
Std(Pcomm) 0.159 0.109 0.145 0.115
Std(ToT) 0.053 0.025 0.043 0.023
Std(GDP) 0.022 0.019 0.024 0.017
corr(ToT,Pcomm) -0.330 0.170 -0.145 0.095
corr(ToT,GDP) -0.190 0.160 -0.067 0.1740
Note: Pcomm denotes the price of the most exported primary commodity.
Table V: Coefficients by country groups
Category Coefficient St. Dev. P statistic
Developed non-PCX 0.181 0.030 0.000
Developed PCX -0.048 0.021 0.022
Developing PCX -0.069 0.016 0.000
Developing non-PCX -0.007 0.020 0.696
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.846
Note: The associated regression is
gdpi,t = α0 +
∑48
i=1
∑4
j=1 αjDi,jToTi,t + εt.
Table VI: Preliminary calibration
Parameter Symbol Value Counterpart
Labor endowment L¯ 10.0
Elasticity of substitution σ 2.0 Ruhl (2008)
Home bias in consumption ω 0.7 Domestic absorption/imports
Final good productivity Ad 1.0 Productivity normalization
Commodity share α 0.1
Commodity productivity Amax 4.5 Primary sector/economy productivity
Labor share γ 0.5
Fixed cost f 0.25
Foreign final good price pf 1.0 Price normalization
Small Open Economy only
Price ratio domestic/commodity pd/pc 1.45
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Table VII: Two-country model – variations for a 1% increase in non-PCX productivity
Variable Commodity exporter Non-commodity exporter
Real GDP 0.05% 11.15%
Terms of trade −4.65% 4.88%
Commodity price 5.40% 5.40%
Measure of commodity producers −1.55% −−−
Commodity share in exports 1.20% −−−
Nominal GDP 4.56% 10.52%
1.8 Figures
Figure 1.1: Standard deviation of terms of trade for PCX and non-PCX
Note: High-income countries (GNI per capita of US$12, 616 or more, according to the World Bank criterion)
are designated by a blue square, while low-income countries are red circles. Figure A.1 has countries with
annual data. The dashed vertical line is the threshold above which a country is a PCX.
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Figure 1.2: Standard deviation of commodity prices and terms of trade for PCX
Note: High-income countries (GNI per capita of US$12, 616 or more, according to the World Bank criterion)
are designated by a blue square, while low-income countries are red circles.
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Figure 1.3: Commodity prices and terms of trade for Australia, Austria, Chile, and Turkey
Note: The figure presents the terms of trade (solid line, left axis) and the price of the most exported
commodity (dashed line, right axis) for Australia (panel 1), Austria (panel 2), Chile (panel 3), and Turkey
(panel 4).
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Figure 1.4: Correlation between terms of trade and primary commodity prices
Note: High-income countries (GNI per capita of US$12, 616 or more, according to the World Bank criterion)
are designated by a blue square, while low-income countries are red circles. The dashed vertical line is the
threshold above which a country is a PCX.
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Figure 1.5: Correlation between terms of trade and real GDP
Note: High-income countries (GNI per capita of US$12, 616 or more, according to the World Bank criterion)
are designated by a blue square, while low-income countries are red circles. The dashed vertical line is the
threshold above which a country is a PCX.
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Figure 1.6: Correlation between terms of trade and real GDP - SOE model
Chapter 2
North-North Migration and
Agglomeration in the European
Union15
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2.1 Introduction
In light of current selective migration reforms, this paper revisits empirical evidence
on migration within the European Union 151 (EU15), disaggregated by occupation. We
document that foreign-born workers within this area live in countries where their type is
relatively more abundant among natives. This is at odds with traditional models of migra-
tion. We build a model with a sector exhibiting external economies of scale that allows for
international labor flows between countries that are similar both in terms of income and
individual characteristics of workers. The main result is that, if a country has a relatively
larger fraction of native population working in a high educated intensive sector, this coun-
try will attract foreign labor of the same type. This is consistent with migration patterns
observed in high-educated occupations in our sample of analysis.
The share of total immigrants relative to the population in Europe is now similar to that
of the United States (US), though that number was much smaller around 1960 (Dustmann
and Frattini, 2012). Regardless of the migratory inflows generated by the decolonization
process and the incorporation of Eastern European countries to the European Union (EU),
20% of the immigrants in the EU15 are native from other EU15 countries. Recent policy
changes are likely to be behind these numbers. Two examples of these changes are: the
creation of a free mobility area, established by the consolidation of the Schengen Area in
1995, and the changes in national policies that formalize agreements reached under the
framework of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA).
The EHEA is the result of a series of agreements signed between 1999 and 2009, involving
changes in national educational policy by the member states2. These changes include the
transferability of academic credits and the mutual recognition of degrees across the EHAE.
While the Schengen Area is just one of many labor free mobility areas in the OECD (OECD,
2012), the EHEA represents the first human capital free mobility area. For our analysis, this
means that, nowadays, skills are more transferable and workers are more mobile within this
area, which enhances the importance of the intra EU migration phenomenon. These two
types of free mobility policies, of workers and skills, are likely to reinforce each other.
Selective migration policies have gained weight, among industrialized countries, in detri-
ment of traditional quotas and family reunification. This type of policies favor inflows of
highly skilled labor. Within the EU, for instance, the United Kingdom is considering adopt-
ing a point-based immigration scheme, where potential immigrants earn points on the basis
1The EU15 comprised the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom.
2All European countries except for Belarus are part of the EHEA.
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of their qualifications and skills, among other factors. More recently, the Great Recession
has brought up concerns that were not present at the time the free mobility agreements were
signed.
Most models that examine migration analyze migration flows from poorer regions, where
a type of labor is abundant, to richer regions, where it is scarce. We relegate the discussion
of these types of models and its by-products to the next subsection, in relation to their main
references. We refer to this approach as the south-north approach. In this setup, immigrants
can have higher expected earnings abroad, because of differences in countries’ income levels
or because of the relative scarcity of their type of labor as compared to the host country.
We will show that this is not the case between workers of the EU15.
Using data from the European Labor Force Survey, we find that, if a EU15 country
has a relatively larger fraction of native population working in a high-educated occupation,
this country will attract foreign EU15 labor of the same type. We also document that
high-educated occupations display concentration patterns in the sense that workers in those
occupations tend to cluster in specific countries.
We develop a model with external economies of scale where wages are strictly increasing
in the amount of high-educated (HE) labor, both foreign and native, employed in a country.
Hence, at the individual level, it is worthy for the most able households to become HE and
to move to the country where there are more HE native workers. This is consistent with
the migration patterns observed in high-educated occupations in our sample of analysis,
which we refer to as north-north migration patterns. Therefore, by incorporating the previ-
ously described agglomeration mechanism, the model we propose in this paper successfully
generates the EU15 migration flows and concentration patterns for our sample data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some of relevant literature in
migration related to our paper. Section 3 describes the data and documents patterns of
intra-EU15 migration by occupation. Section 4 describes the model and the equilibrium.
Section 5 reports and discusses the results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
A large proportion of the literature on migration focuses on migration flows from low
income (south) to high income (north) countries. An emblematic case is the US-Mexico
migration. In this literature, individuals migrate because of the relative scarcity of their
own type of labor in the host country, which rewards those that cross the border with higher
labor earnings. International labor flows generate a reallocation of labor that is jointly
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determined by the demand and the supply of both native and foreign workers. Once net
wages equalize in both countries, this approach predicts that migration flows will cease. We
refer to this approach as the south-north approach.
Recent policy changes have driven attention to a different type of labor flows where
workers migrate to countries similar to their source country and where their type is relatively
more abundant. We refer to this as north-north migration. This type of flows can not be
explained by the south-north literature because its basic mechanism is contradicted from the
beginning. This section reviews some of the migration literature in line with the south-north
traditional approach and point to where they fail to explain and predict the intra-EU15 flows.
A new generation of migration models was born when self-selection of immigrants and
brain drain started to gain importance. A seminal work in self-selection of immigrants is
Borjas (1994). In his model, self-selection is driven by the correlation between skills across
countries and their relative earnings distribution dispersion. With this model, Borjas aims
to explain migration flows towards the United States and the differences in the earnings of
immigrants by country of origin. Moreover, immigrant cohorts from the same source country
might differ according to changes in the relative rate of return to skill. Despite his claim
that his model is able to explain migration flows for many host countries, this is only true
when the host country is relatively richer than the source country.
Urrutia (2001) goes a step further in this line of thought and models migration flows from
Mexico and India to the US in a south-north approach. He extends the analysis allowing
for differences in migration costs due to distance and language barriers, that he models
as a fixed cost and as a temporary loss of ability respectively. By considering these two
aspects, Urrutia generates a self-selection pattern that can account for heterogeneity in the
performance of immigrants from different source countries, which is observed in the data.
His main result is that immigrants from distant countries are more likely to belong to the top
abilities distribution. This result goes in the opposite direction to the one we are interested
in this paper, where migrants from and to EU15 move across proximal countries and yet
belong to the top abilities distribution for some occupations.
Lopez-Real (2011) incorporates a new source of heterogeneity of workers. In his model,
workers are heterogeneous in years of schooling and ability. Lopez-Real finds that self-
selection in ability is always positive and that differences in TFP determine whether self-
selection in schooling is positive or negative. Nonetheless, his model cannot explain the
concentration we document among EU15 countries. Moreover Lopez-Real assumes the host
country is a large open economy while the source country is a small open economy. This is
not the case for EU15 countries since they are similar in terms of size and openness.
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Dustmann and Frattini (2012) provide an overview of immigration to Europe from the
SecondWorld War to the early 2010s. The authors document the existing disparities between
immigrants born in the EU and those born outside of the EU, with special focus on labor
markets. Overall, they find that EU immigrants are more similar to the native population
than immigrants from elsewhere. For instance, EU immigrants are more similar to natives
with respect to occupational and educational attainment distributions. Non-EU immigrants
are found to be more concentrated than EU nationals in less skilled occupations. Hence
their observations support our evidence that the intra-EU migration flow differentiates itself
from the aggregate migration flow to the EU15 countries in a peculiar way: a large fraction
of it mimics the characteristics of the national population, with some exceptions.
Dustmann and Frattini (2012) calculate the employment probability for those groups
controlling for gender, education, region and age. They conclude that non-EU immigrants
are in disadvantage in all countries studied, lagging behind by at most 20 percentage points
in employment probability compared to natives with the same characteristics. Meanwhile
EU immigrants are at most 8 percentage points behind. The differences across immigrants
documented in their work foster relevant questions that are left unanswered by the traditional
south-north literature. Why are migration flows across EU15 countries more intense than
what is predicted by the south-north models provided that those countries are considerably
more homogeneous? Why do the EU15 migrants are so different from those coming from
other parts of the world?
The model of this paper is based on Chipman (1970). For our model, the most impor-
tant feature of his theoretical framework is the presence of increasing returns to scale in
the production of the skilled intensive good, that are external at the firm level. This is the
main force that induces agglomeration of workers with similar characteristics after migra-
tion. In this paper, we use the aforementioned feature and generalize the model of Haupt
and Uebelmesser (2010), which focus on high-educated flows, by creating a second sector
with a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology, and by having a general equilibrium
environment. We incorporate features of their model by allowing households to simulta-
neously choose education and migration in the skilled intensive sector. In the future our
aim is to open the migration option for workers in the CRS sector too, in order to generate
heterogeneity of migration flows.
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2.3 Data and Empirical Evidence
2.3.1 Data and Classifications
One of the main limitations of the analysis of migration patterns across different countries
is the lack of comparable data. It is often the case that each country uses a different definition
of immigrant based on either nationality or country of origin. Harmonized data on migration
status and occupation for European countries are available from two sources: the European
Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS), which consists of repeated cross-sections of individuals from
1983-2013; and the Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC), which reports
aggregate numbers of workers by different demographic and labor market categories based
on Census data, with a comprehensive list of variables and countries only for the year 20013.
In this analysis, we use the EU-LFS and we consider a worker to be immigrant if she was
born in a country different from the one in which she works.
The European Union Labor Force Survey Database
The European Union Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS hereafter) is a harmonized household
sample survey that contains quarterly detailed information on individuals per country for 28
European countries. The data covers the years from 1983 onwards, due to availability of our
variables of interest we keep the years of 1996 to 2010, for a total of 31,663,252 observations.
The core variables are country of residence, country of birth, educational attainment,
employment status, hours worked and occupation. They use the the 1988 International
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88 hereafter) to identify occupations. Out of
the 28 countries available in the EU-LFS, we keep EU15 countries.
The ISCO-88: Description and Relation to Educational Classification
The ISCO-88 is one of the occupational classifications published by the International
Labour Office (ILO, 1990). It uses information on national coding for over 80 countries and
organizes them into a standard classification of occupations.
Even though each occupation presents a different skill specialization content in terms
of tasks,we find convenient is that its ordering coincides with its corresponding educational
level. In particular, eight of the nine major ISCO-884 groups are ordered with reference
to education levels5 defined for ISCO-88 (See Table A.2 for a detailed description of each
3A version for 2005 is available, but the information disaggregated by occupation is incomplete for a
large part of the countries.
4We exclude Armed Forces (group 0).
5The ISCO levels of education are based on the first (1976) version of the International Standard Clas-
sification of Education (ISCED). ISCO defines 4 levels of education: 1 for primary education, 2 for lower
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group). Five out of nine major ISCO-88 groups (4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) have the same average
education level (lower or upper secondary education). These five groups, together with
Elementary Services (group 9)6, will be considered Low-Educated in the analysis below. The
remaining groups (1-3) include occupations that require tertiary education and therefore will
be classified as High-Educated.
2.3.2 Empirical Analysis
This section is organized in three parts. In the first part, we provide empirical support
our north-north approach showing that EU15 immigrants are different from non EU15.
Henceforth we limit the study to foreign-born workers whose country of origin is a EU15
member. Then we focus on the distribution of foreign-born workers across occupations,
compared to the distribution of native-born workers. In the second part, we compute the
correlation between the occupational distributions of foreign-born workers and that of native-
born workers, for each country. We use this correlation to explain the relation between
natives and foreigners. Finally in the third part, we compute a proxy for concentration
of total workers depending on their occupation. For this measure, we use the educational
component of the ISCO-88. A detailed definition and explanation of these measures will be
provided below.
North-North Empirical Analysis
Many authors7 have emphasized the differences between EU15 immigrants and other for-
eigners. In particular, EU15 immigrants have similar characteristics as natives, for example
both groups have high levels of education and are more concentrated in skilled occupations.
Figure 2.1 depicts the distribution of employment across occupations, ordered by wage,
for natives and foreigners. In line with previous findings, we observe that EU15 foreigners
behave in a similar fashion as natives and very differently from non EU15 immigrants. Addi-
tionally, in panel (a) we observe that the share of EU15 foreigners exceeds that of natives in
the top paid occupations. Panel (b) in Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of this distributions.
Notice that this graph is reminiscent of the polarization literature: employment growth is
larger in both tails of the wage distribution and negative in the middle, for natives and EU15
immigrants. We emphasize that both the share and growth rate of EU15 workers in the top
paid occupations exceed that of any other group. In this paper we will concentrate on this
particular group of occupations.
and upper secondary education, 3 for tertiary education not leading to a university degree and 4 for tertiary
education leading to a university degree.
6Elementary Services is the only major group of occupations in which the average education level is
primary school.
7Dustmann and Frattini (2012) among others, see references.
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Figure 2.1: Employment distribution: Percentage (2010) and growth rate (1996-2010)
(a) Employment by migrant status
(b) Growth rate of employment (1996-2010)
Note: Wage ranking orders occupations by their mean wage across 10 European countries across all
years, following wage information in Goos et al. (2014). We restrict the number of countries to match
their wage ranking. Panel (a) plots the median spline of employment shares by migrant status, pooled
across countries. Panel (b) plots the median spline of the growth rate of these employment shares from
1996-2010.For detailed information on occupations refer to Table A.1 in the appendix.
Occupational Migration Patterns
“Do people migrate to countries where there are more native workers of their type or
where there are less?” This subsection addresses this question from an empirical perspective.
First, we define the occupational distribution of foreign and native workers in country i
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as:
SiN =
(
siN1, s
i
N2, ..., s
i
NJ
)
, where siNj ≡
# native workers in occupation j and country i
# native workers in country i
SiI =
(
siI1, s
i
I2, ..., s
i
IJ
)
, where siIj ≡ # EU15-immigrant workers in occupation j and country i
# EU15-immigrant workers in country i
,
respectively, where J is the number of subgroups considered, J = 26 for the ISCO 2-digit.
Then, for each occupation j , we extract the shares by country for both native and im-
migrant workers: (s1Nj , ..., s
I
Nj) and (s
1
Ij , ..., s
I
Ij). Next, we compute the correlation between
the occupational distribution of native workers and that of EU15 foreign-born workers. We
interpret this as an empirical measure of how EU15 foreign-born workers allocate themselves
across countries based on the given distribution of natives. More specifically, we regress SiN
on SiI and a set of year dummies. Table I shows an example of how this shares look like for
for subgroup 12 (Corporate Managers).
Table I: Share of Natives and Immigrants by Country of Residence
12: Corporate Managers, 2010
Country Share Natives Share Foreign EU-15
Austria 3.56 6.02
Belgium 7.40 14.12
Denmark 2.81 4.40
Spain 2.52 3.64
Finland 6.51 4.70
France 5.88 5.95
Greece 1.69 2.00
Ireland 9.08 14.60
Italy 2.09 2.75
Luxembourg 1.51 3.36
Netherlands 5.38 4.72
Norway 5.48 5.75
Portugal 2.07 3.98
Sweden 4.57 3.74
United Kingdom 12.07 11.53
Column 2 includes the ratio between the number of native-born workers in
occupation 12 and the total number of native-born workers. Column 3 includes
the ratio between the number of foreign-born workers in occupation 12 and
the total number of foreign-born workers.
We obtain a correlation of 0.66, significant at the 1% level. As a comparison, this number
is only 0.40 for immigrants from outside the EU15. The result of this empirical analysis is
that if a country has a relatively larger fraction of native population working in a high-
educated occupation, Managers in the example shown in Table I, this country will attract
foreign labor of the same type.To answer the question that we posed at the beginning of the
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subsection, people do migrate to countries where there are more native workers of their type.
This is an example of what we previously referred to as north-north migration patterns.
Concentration Patterns
“Do countries keep a balanced distribution of workers across occupations or are some
groups of workers more concentrated in one country?” To answer this question, we present
a measure of concentration of workers.
First, we define the occupational distribution of the total working population in country
i as:
Si =
(
si1, s
i
2, ..., s
i
J
)
, where sij ≡
# all workers in occupation j and country i
# all workers in country i
Recall that ISCO-88 occupations are ordered according to educational level. In the data
description we have defined high and low-educated occupations. Notice that we can express
Si as SiHE
⋃
SiLE , where S
i
HE contains the shares corresponding to subgroups of groups 1-3,
and SiLE those to subgroups of groups 4-9. Then, for each pair of countries in our sample,
i and h, we compute Corr(SiHE , S
h
HE) and Corr(S
i
LE , S
h
LE), for each year of the sample.
Then for each country i and year we compute the average (across education levels) of each
pairwise correlation with the other countries in the sample. Finally we calculate the average
across years.
We want to emphasize the difference with respect to the previous analysis. In this case,
the population of analysis is total working population in each occupation, regardless of their
country of birth. Second, this correlation is computed over the occupational distribution,
by education group.
We interpret a positive correlation as evidence that the country keeps a balanced struc-
ture in that education group. A negative correlation means that a country has a lower share
of its working population in occupations where other countries have a high share. We take
this as evidence of concentration.
Table II presents the average correlations. We find two main results: First, for low-
educated occupations, countries keep a more balanced structure, i.e., average correlations are
positive and high in general. Second, for high-educated occupations, there are concentration
patterns. In this occupation group, the results are more heterogeneous, yet correlations are
generally lower and even negative for some cases.
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Table II: Concentration Patterns (1996-2010)
Country Average Correlation Average CorrelationHigh Skill Low Skill
Austria .31 .75
Belgium .34 .65
Denmark .49 .76
Spain .58 .69
Finland .58 .68
France .47 .77
Greece .15 .39
Ireland -.15 .79
Italy .25 .66
Luxembourg .57 .53
Netherlands .58 .76
Norway .38 .64
Portugal .45 .44
Sweden .57 .67
United Kingdom -.43 .74
We will use these two main findings of education and concentration as input in our
model. We will have two sectors: One will exhibit constant returns to scale and employ only
low-educated labor. The other one will exhibit increasing returns to scale and employ only
high-educated workers.
2.4 The Model
Framework
We consider a static, one-period model of education and migration choice. An economy
consists of firms, households and governments. There are two countries: 1 and 2. Both coun-
tries have identical production technologies and initial size. We normalize initial population
size to 1 in each country.
There are two productive sectors in each country: one displays constant returns to scale
(CRS) and the other one increasing returns to scale (IRS) at the industry level, i.e. IRS
are external to the firm. They produce using High-Educated (HE) and Low-Educated (LE)
labor, respectively.
Households are heterogeneous in ability and mobility. They make consumption, educa-
tion and migration decisions and they supply labor inelastically. Their education decision
44
determines the type of labor they will supply (HE or LE) and their migration choice de-
termines their country of residence. Finally, there is a government that collects education
payments of high-educated workers and transfers them to households in a lump sum fashion.
We begin with a closed economy, in which there is no migration choice. Next, we analyze
a two-country open economy model, where we allow for free mobility of goods, labor and
degrees (skills)8.
2.4.1 Closed Economy
Production
There are two goods in the economy: Y and Z. Sector Y is composed of a continuum of
symmetric firms in the interval [0, 1] that use HE labor as their only input. Output of firm
k ∈ [0, 1] is:
yk = A(H) · hk, where H =
∫ 1
0
hkdk, (2.1)
where A′ > 0, A′′ < 0 and hk is the amount of HE labor used by firm k.
Production of good Y exhibits IRS at the country-industry level, but these are external
to individual firms. The more HE workers in the economy, the higher the output of each
producer. However, each firm k ∈ [0, 1] is atomless and does not internalize its effect on
aggregate demand of HE labor in their country. Therefore, each individual firm considers
the productivity term in the production function as a constant and behaves competitively.
Inverse demand of HE workers is given by:
wH = A(H) · PY (2.2)
For simplicity, and since firms are identical, we characterize the equilibrium using a
representative firm that demands h and produces Y .
Good Z is produced by a representative firm. The only input for production is LE labor
and it has the following CRS technology:
Z = B · L, (2.3)
where B ≥ 1 and L denotes the amount of LE labor used.
8In order to capture the free transferability of academic credits and the mutual recognition of degrees
across the EHAE.
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The inverse demand for LE workers is given by:
wL = PZ ·B. (2.4)
Households and Government
Households are heterogeneous in ability. They are born low educated and can decide to
remain uneducated and earn wL working in the CRS sector. Alternatively, they can choose
to acquire high education by paying an individual specific cost9 and then earn wH working
in the IRS sector. Regardless of their choice, they supply labor inelastically since there is
no disutility from working.
At the beginning of the period, each household j ∈ [0, 1] makes an ability draw that
determines her education cost θj , which is negatively related to ability. For the most able
individual, education will be free. For the least able individual, the cost will be the highest
possible cost, θ¯. Education costs are uniformly distributed in the interval
[
0, θ¯
]
.
Given ability, prices, wages and transfers
(
θj , PY , PZ , wH , wL, T
)
, each household j
chooses an education level and consumption bundle
{
ej ∈ {HE,LE} , cjY , cjZ
}
to solve:
max
{ej ,cjY ,cjZ}
λ log cjY + (1− λ) log cjZ
s.t. PY c
j
Y + PZc
j
Z ≤W j
W j = wH − θj + T if ej = HE
W j = wL + T if ej = LE
cjY ≥ 0, cjZ ≥ 0
The last agent of our economy is the government (G). This agent collects education
payments and transfers them equally to all households in a lump-sum fashion . The revenue
of the government is given by:
GR =
∫
H
θjdj =
∫ θ∗
0
θjdF (θ) =
∫ θ∗
0
dF (θ), (2.5)
where F is the cdf of θj , H ≡
{
j ∈ [0, 1] | ej = H} and θ∗ is a threshold that characterizes
the set of educated workers. We will elaborate further on this cutoff value in the next
subsection. Government expenditures are equal to:
GE =
∫ 1
0
Tdj, (2.6)
9In general, the education cost can be interpreted as effort or ability.
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where T is the per capita transfer.
Definition 2.4.1 Autarky Equilibrium: Given the ability distribution U [0, θ¯], a compet-
itive equilibrium for this economy is: (i) education and consumption choices from house-
holds:
{(
ej , cjY , c
j
Z
)}
j∈[0,1]
, (ii) production plans: (Z,L, Y, h), (iii) lump-sum transfers T ,
(iv) prices: {PZ , PY , wH , wL} and (v) an endogenous threshold θ∗ such that:
1. Given prices, transfers the ability draw θj, (c
j
Y , c
j
Z , e
j) solves j’s problem, ∀j.
2. Given prices, the production plan of the IRS sector, (Y, h), satisfies wH = A(H) · PY .
3. Given prices, the production plan of the CRS sector (Z,L) satisfies wL = B · PZ .
4. Government budget balances: ∫
H
θjdj =
∫ 1
0
Tdj
5. Labor markets clear
Hs ≡
∫
H
jdj
H ≡ h = Hs
H + L = 1
6. Goods markets clear
Y =
∫
H
cjY dj +
∫
Hc
cjY dj
Z =
∫
H
cjZdj +
∫
Hc
cjZdj
Characterization of the Equilibrium
Households consumption demand functions are:
cY =
(λ)
PY
·W j (2.7)
cZ =
(1− λ)
PZ
·W j , (2.8)
Given the ability draw θj , households maximize net labor income in order to maximize
utility. Their education decision boils down to:
ej =
HE if wH − θj ≥ wLLE otherwise (2.9)
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This inequality determines individual supply of HE labor. Using the distribution of educa-
tion costs θj ∼ U [0, θ¯], we get an expression for aggregate supply of HE labor:
H = F (wH − wL) = wH − wL
θ¯
(2.10)
Notice that equation 2.10 implies that, all else equal, the higher the maximum cost
of acquiring education, the smaller the share of HE people working in the IRS sector. We
emphasize this result, since it will be the main difference between countries in the integrated
economy. Note that the education decision is determined by a cutoff rule: every household
j with θj ≤ θ∗ will become HE, where θ∗ = w∗H − w∗L.
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we normalize PY ≡ 1. Combining
the firm’s inverse demand for labor and using the market clearing conditions:
H∗ =
A(H)−BP ∗Z(H)
θ¯
(2.11)
P ∗Z(H) =
(1− λ)HA(H)
λB(1−H) (2.12)
In Figure 2.2, we illustrate the equilibrium under different ability supports. We use the
following specification: A(H) = Hα, α = 0.5, λ = 0.8, B = 1, θ¯1 = 2 and θ¯2 = 3.
Figure 2.2: Autarky Equilibrium
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2.4.2 Integrated Economy
We now consider an integrated world economy consisting of two countries indexed by
i. Countries are identical in production technologies, preferences and population sizes, but
differ in the distribution of ability. The world population is normalized to 2 (1 for each
country). Both goods are tradable and both countries are big.
Households are heterogeneous in mobility and ability. In each country, there is an ex-
ogenous fraction γ ∈ (0, 1) that is perfectly mobile, and a fraction (1− γ) that is perfectly
immobile. Both types of labor, HE and LE, are perfect substitutes across countries. That
is, natives and immigrants are assumed to be equally productive. The ability distribution
is U [0, θ¯i] , where θ¯i, i ∈ {1, 2}, is now country specific. The distribution of ability is the
same across mobile and immobile groups. People pay for education in their country of origin
and can freely transfer their degree across countries.
Firms’ problems in each country remain unchanged. Since both goods are perfectly
tradable, prices will equalize across countries. This, together with the fact that the CRS
sectors are identical, imply that wages of the low educated sector are also equalized across
countries (w1L = w
2
L).
In the open economy we have two types of households: mobile and immobile. Immobile
ones face the same problem as in the closed economy. Mobile households, however, now have
the additional choice of migration. More formally, a mobile worker j in country i chooses:
(i) Her education level: eij ∈ {HE,LE}, which determines the sector where she will work.
(ii) Her migration status: mij ∈ {N,M}, where N stands for Native and M for Migrant.
This decision, given (i), determines her country of residence and, therefore, her wage.
Given mobility, ability, prices, wages and transfers
(
γ, θij , PY , PZ , w
i
H , w
i
L, T
i
)
, each
household j from country i ∈ {1, 2} chooses an education level, a migration status and a
consumption bundle:
{
eij ∈ {HE,LE} ,mij ∈ {N,M} , cyij , czij
}
to solve:
max
{ej ,mj ,cyj ,czj}
λ log cyij + (1− λ) log czij
s.t. PY cy
i
j + PZcz
i
j ≤W ij
where W ij = w
i
H − θij + T i if eij = HE mij = N
W ij = w
−i
H − θij + T i if eij = HE mij = M
W ij = w
i
L + T
i if eij = LE ∀mij
s.t. cyj ≥ 0 czj ≥ 0
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Without loss of generality, we assume that, in the case of indifference, a worker remains
in her country of origin. This implies that low-educated individuals will always stay in their
home country, i.e. mij = N if e
i
j = LE.
Since households pay for education in their country of origin, regardless of their migration
status, government revenue in country i revenue becomes:
GRi =
∫
HiN
θijdj +
∫
HiM
θijdj =
∫
HiN
⋃HiM θ
i
jdj,
where HiN denotes the set of HE workers born in country i that choose to stay home, and
HiM is the set of HE workers that choose to work abroad. Formally:
HiN =
{
j ∈ [0, 1] | eij = HE and mij = N
}
HiM =
{
j ∈ [0, 1] | eij = HE and mij = M
}
Thresholds and HE Labor Supply
In the integrated economy, education level and migration status are jointly determined.
Because of mobility heterogeneity, there are two cutoffs for each country: one for immobile
and one for mobile workers. The first one is determined by the education premium at home,
and the second one can be decomposed in a migration premium and an education premium.
For immobile workers, the education decision follows the same rule as in the closed
economy. Therefore an immobile worker j from country i becomes HE if her net wage of
working in the HE intensive sector of i is higher than the one she would earn in i if she
remains LE, i.e., wiH − θij ≥ wL. The threshold for immobile workers in country i is thus
given by:
θi∗immobile = w
i
H − wL (2.13)
and every immobile individual j with θij ≤ θi∗immobile will choose eij = HE.
For intuition, we define wiH − wL as the education premium at home, this is the spread
between the wage of a high educated worker and a low educated one. Notice the threshold
for immobile workers is given by this premium and every worker that needs to pay a a cost
below this value will choose to be high educated and benefit from the spread.
For mobile workers, the education decision must now incorporate the possibility of higher
earnings abroad. Hence a mobile worker j in country i decides to become HE if her net wage
of working in the HE intensive sector of one of the two countries is higher than the one she
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would earn in i if she remains LE, i.e., max
{
wiH , w
−i
H
} − θij ≥ wL. The education cost
threshold for mobile workers is thus given by:
θi∗mobile = max
{
wiH , w
−i
H
}− wL (2.14)
and every mobile individual j with θij ≤ θi∗mobile will choose eij = HE.
Regarding the migration decision, a HE worker will go wherever she gets a higher wage.
This is, ∀j with eij = HE:
mij = N if w
i
H ≥ w−iH
mij = M otherwise
Further manipulation of the threshold for mobile workers (??) show that it can be de-
composed in a migration and an education premium as follows:
θi∗mobile = max
{
wiH , w
−i
H
}− wL = max{wiH , w−iH }− wiH︸ ︷︷ ︸
Migration Premium
+ wiH − wL︸ ︷︷ ︸
Education Premium
If the migration premium is positive, mobile HE workers benefit from both premia. They
earn higher wages because they are high educated and on top of that they get access to even
higher wages abroad because they migrate.
Definition 2.4.2 Integrated Equilibrium: Given mobility γ and ability distributions
U [0, θ¯i], i ∈ {1, 2}, a competitive equilibrium for the two-country economy is:
• education, migration and consumption choices from households:
{
eij ,m
i
j , cy
i
j , cz
i
j
}
j∈[0,1],i∈{1,2}
,
• production plans:
{
Y i, hi, Zi, Li
}
i∈{1,2},
• lump-sum transfers from the government
{
T i
}
i∈{1,2}
• prices:
{
wiH , w
i
L
}
i∈{1,2}, P
w
Z , P
w
Y , and
• cutoff education costs:
{
θi∗immobile, θ
i∗
mobile
}
i∈{1,2} such that:
1. Given prices, transfers, mobility and ability θij:
{
eij ,m
i
j , cy
i
j , cz
i
j
}
i∈{1,2}
solve j’s prob-
lem ∀j
2. Given prices, production plans of IRS sectors
{
Y i, hi
}
i∈{1,2} satisfy w
i
H = A(H
i) ·PwY
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3. Given prices, production plans of CRS sectors
{
Zi, Li
}
i∈{1,2} satisfy wL = B · PwZ
4. Government budget balances in each country (i = 1, 2):∫
HiN
⋃HiM θ
i
jdj =
∫ 1
0
T idj
5. Labor markets clear (in each i = 1, 2):
Hsi ≡
∫
Hi
jdj
hi = H i H i = H iN +H
−i
M
Li = LiN + L
−i
M
1 =H iN +H
i
M + L
i
N wlog L
−i
M = 0
6. Good markets clear:
Y 1 + Y 2 =
∫
H1
cHY dj +
∫
H2
cHY dj +
∫
L1
cLY dj +
∫
L2
cLY dj
Z1 + Z2 =
∫
H1
cHZ dj +
∫
H2
cHZ dj +
∫
L1
cLZdj +
∫
L2
cLZdj
Where Hi = HiN
⋃HiM and Li = (HiN ⋃HiM)c.
Characterization of the Integrated Equilibrium
For households, optimal consumption choices are as in the closed economy. However,
the introduction of migration choice generates two equilibrium objects in the HE sector:
(i) Aggregate supply of native HE labor H iN and (ii) Aggregate supply HE emigrants H
i
M .
Each one is determined in equilibrium according to individual-specific mobility and ability
draw, following the cutoff rules described above. These thresholds are determined by the
relative price of final goods, which, at the same time, depend on the aggregate stock of HE
workers.
Individual supply of HE immobile labor is given by
eij = HE if w
i
H − θij ≥ wL
Using the distribution of θij and the share of immobile workers 1−γ, we get an expression
for the aggregate supply of immobile HE native workers:
H iN,immobile =
(
wiH − wiL
θ¯i
)
· (1− γ) (2.15)
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Individual supply of HE mobile labor is given by:
eij = HE if max
{
wiH , w
−i
H
}− θij ≥ wL
Using the distribution of θij and the share of mobile workers γ, we get an expression for
the aggregate supply of mobile HE natives and emigrants:
H iN,mobile =
(
wiH−wiL
θ¯i
)
· γ H iM = 0 if wiH ≥ w−iH (2.16)
H iN,mobile = 0 H
i
M =
(
wiH − wiL
θ¯i
)
· γ otherwise, (2.17)
where
H i = H iN −H iM +H−iM , H iN = H iN,mobile +H iN,immobile
wiH = A(H
i)
wiL = BPz
Pz =
(1− λ) (A(H i) ·H i +A(H−i) ·H−i)
λ(2−H i −H−i)
This completes the characterization of equilibria for the general case. In the next section,
we provide a discussion of specific cases.
2.5 Results and Discussion
We are interested on the comparison of countries with different distribution of native HE
population. In particular we want model two countries, one with a higher fraction of native
HE workers to show it will attract HE immigrants, in line with our empirical analysis. In
our model we generate a heterogeneity on HE native shares by considering different abilities
distribution, which in turns translates into different education costs.
Assumption 2.5.1 Maximum education cost in country 1 is lower than in country 2, i.e.
θ¯1 < θ¯2.
Assumption 2.5 implies that, in autarky, both the share of HE workers and their wage
are higher in country 1 than in country 2 10.
10See Figure 2.2.
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Since the sector that uses HE labor as input exhibits external economies of scale, we
expect that, by opening the borders and allowing for labor mobility, foreign HE workers
will flow to country 1. This will be analyzed in Case 1.
We acknowledge that in our model, as in other models with external economies of scale,
there is a multiplicity of equilibria. For our analysis, this means that, even if country 1 has
a higher labor and wage in the HE intensive sector in autarky, it is possible for HE labor
to cluster in country 2. For this equilibrium to arise, people would need to expect higher
wages in country 2 even though they are lower in autarky. For completeness, we will briefly
discuss this equilibrium in Case 2 11
For Case 1 we conjecture and impose12 that w1wH > w
2w
H .
As a result, every mobile household from 2 will migrate to country 1, whereas every
mobile household from country 1 will stay there. Figure 2.3 illustrates this equilibrium and
contrasts it to the equilibrium in autarky. For the open case, we set the ratio θ¯2/θ¯1 to 1.5
and the mobile fraction γ to 0.5 13. In particular we use θ¯1 = 2 and θ¯2 = 3 to account for
the differences in ability. Table ?? contains the numerical results, and Figure 2.3 provides
an illustration. In autarky, 22% of the total population in country 1 is HE, in contrast to
11% in country 2. When workers are allowed to move freely, these numbers change to 39%
and 1%, respectively. This is, 39% of the residents of country 1 are employed by the IRS
sector, while only 1% of the residents of country 2 are HE.
11We plan to extend the analysis of this Case by introducing beliefs in the model. However at this stage
of the paper, we have not modeled them modeled beliefs explicitly, this is an additional reason for why we
will only comment briefly on Case 2.
12After this conjecture we verify with the numerical results, following a guess and verify approach.
13The rest of the parameters are the same as in Figure 1 of the closed economy
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Figure 2.3: Specialization Patterns: Case 1
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Table III: Numerical Results
Autarky Integrated
Country 1 Country 2 Country 1 Country 2
Residents 1 1 1 +H2M 1−H2M
HE 21.66 10.47 39.14 1.13
LE 78.34 89.53 70.64 89.08
The relation between HE immigrants and HE natives in country 1 is given by:
H2M
H1N
=
θ¯1
θ¯2
γ (2.18)
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Equation 2.18 establishes a linear relation between HE natives and immigrants. Given
a stock of H1N , the share of workers who migrate from country 2 to 1 is determined by two
factors, depending only on parameters of the model. The first one is trivial: immigration
increases with mobility (higher γ). The second factor is the relative difference in education
costs: the higher the education costs in country 2 with respect to country 1, the lower the
share of immigrants for a given number of HE natives. For a constant level of θ¯1, increases
in θ¯2 discourage workers from country 2 from becomming HE since the cost they have to
pay at home does not compensate for the higher wages abroad.
As Case 1 and Figure 2.3 illustrate, the main result of our model is that if a country
has a relatively larger fraction of native population working in the high educated (IRS)
sector, this country will attract foreign labor of the same type. This is consistent with
"north-north" migration patterns observed in HE occupations our sample of analysis. The
model we propose in this paper allows for the possibility of workers migrating to a place
where there are more of their type, as opposed to the standard south-north approach where
migration flows are due to scarcity: workers migrating to places where there are less of their
type.
Additionally we find that in a human capital free mobility are with free mobility of labor
and transferability of education, the interaction between migration and education decisions
increase the total HE labor stock. Other workers decide to become HE to take advantage of
migration premium and spillovers from the IRS sector. This translates into agents willing
to pay higher education costs (see Figure 2.4).
Figure 2.4: Thresholds
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In our numerical exercise, the threshold for becoming HE increases for both countries
under the integrated economy. In the host country HE wages increase with the inflow of
HE immigrants due to the production externality and therefore more people become HE.
In the source country mobile workers are willing to pay more for their education since they
can benefit from higher wages abroad.
In Case 2, even though we begin with w1aH > w
2a
H , we conjecture and impose w
1w
H < w
2w
H .
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As a result, there is agglomeration of HE labor in country 2 14. Despite the fact that this case
is possible, it is not desirable because it induces a lower level of world GDP, consumption
and welfares (see Table IV).
Table IV: Sectoral Output, World GDP and Welfare
Output Welfare
Y1 + Y2 Z1 + Z2 Total GDP Cou.1 Cou.2 Total
Case 1 0.25 1.60 0.31 -1.60 -2.39 -3.99
Case 2 0.18 1.64 0.23 -2.25 -2.14 -4.40
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have first provided evidence that, if a EU15 country has a relatively
larger fraction of native population working in a high-educated occupation, this country will
attract foreign EU15 labor of the same type. This result is in line with what we have refer to
as north-north migration pattern, where workers migrate to countries similar to their source
country and where their type is relatively more abundant. We have also documented that
high-educated occupations display concentration patterns in the sense that workers in those
occupations tend to cluster in specific countries.
As we have emphasized, the intra EU15 migration phenomenon cannot be studied under
the traditional south-north approach. The reason is that this framework assumes differences
between the source and the host countries in terms of both income and characteristics of
their labor force that are not observed in the EU15. To fill this gap, in this paper we
propose a model that allows for workers flows between similar countries. Moreover, our
model successfully generates the EU15 migration patterns we have documented and it also
rationalizes agglomeration consistent with the concentration findings we have documented.
The mechanism of our model is the following: wages for HE labor are strictly increasing
in the amount of HE labor, both foreign and native, employed in a country. This is achieved
via external economies of scale in the sector intensive in HE labor. Hence, at the individual
14See the system of equations that determines the equilibria and the figure in appendix.
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level, it becomes worthy for the most able households to become HE and to move to the
country where there are more HE native workers.
To properly analyze selective policies of migration, it is imperative to propose better
mechanisms of analysis that allow for bilateral flows of workers from economically similar
countries. The theoretical framework developed in this paper provides useful insight about
how to model a mechanism capable of driving migration and generating agglomeration.
Our model can be extended along several dimensions. For instance, we used the con-
venient relation between the ISCO-88 occupation classification and the education level to
relate our model to the data. However, we acknowledge that reducing the types of workers
to be based only on education limits the applications of our model. In this sense, allowing for
occupational differences might be insightful. We think important differences arise in terms
of transferability of skills and mobility between occupations, regardless of their education
level. Additionally we could allow for migration in the CRS sector.
Another interesting direction is to include more structure in the CRS sector. In particular
we could include a sector in the model that displays CRS or even decreasing returns to scale,
and that is attached to the size or structure of the population in each country. This could
be interesting since there are differences within the low-educated (LE) group in the data.
Service Elementary occupations workers behave very differently from, for example, Machine
Operators15. This could happen because the former group faces a considerably inelastic
demand and is directly attached to the population size. In contrast, the latter group is more
exposed to country-specific sectoral shocks. For instance, we think of the 2000’s construction
boom in Spain as an exogenous increase in Spain’s construction labor productivity, Bi, that
can drive a positive correlation between the share of native and immigrants.
15Groups 91 and 81 at the 2-digit ISCO-88 level, respectively.
Chapter 3
Macroeconomic Effects of Medicare
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3.1 Introduction
Medicare is one of the largest health insurance programs in the world. In 2015 it pro-
vided health insurance to about 52 million Americans and comprised 17.3 percent of federal
outlays, or 3.6 percent of GDP. This paper aims to improve our understanding of the role
of Medicare in the macroeconomy. To do this, we develop a general equilibrium overlapping
generations model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous consumers. In the model,
consumers differ along the dimensions of age, education, health status, labor productivity,
assets, and health insurance status. The consumers are subject to idiosyncratic uncertainty
on their labor productivity and health, the latter of which determines their medical ex-
penses. While shocks to labor productivity are uninsurable, medical expenses are partially
insurable in the form of Medicare, Medicaid, private, and employer-provided health insur-
ance. We use the model to calculate the effects of an unexpected elimination of Medicare.
This numerical experiment enables us to capture the effects of Medicare on macroeconomic
aggregates, insurance enrollment, government spending, and welfare.
We start by comparing the steady state of the economy with and without Medicare.
Eliminating Medicare leads to a 2.7 percentage point reduction in payroll taxes and a 1.3
percent increase in wages. Wages increase because capital increase as consumers raise their
saving to finance the higher cost of medical expenses in old age. The combination of higher
wages and lower payroll taxes raises labor supply and generates an increase in output per
capita of 2.0 percent.
We then compare the insurance distribution in the two economies. Our results show that
a large share of the elderly respond by substituting Medicaid for Medicare. This increases
spending on Medicaid from 3.6 to 5.3 percent of GDP. Spending on Social Security benefits
also increases from 4.7 to 4.8 percent of GDP because wages surge following the rise in
capital. As a result, government spending as a share of GDP only declines by 1.5 percentage
points following the elimination of Medicare. We thus find that the government saves only
46 cents for every dollar it cuts on Medicare due to offsetting spending on Medicaid and
Social Security.
Next, we examine the ex-ante welfare effects of the reform on unborn consumers under
the veil of ignorance. We find that ex-ante welfare is higher in the steady state without
Medicare. In particular, we find that consumption has to increase by 3.6 percent in all
periods and contingencies in the economy with Medicare to make an unborn consumer
under the veil of ignorance indifferent between the two steady states. This follows from the
observation that the reform leads to lower taxes and higher wages, both of which facilitate
higher consumption and saving.
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We then examine the ex-post welfare effects of the reform on the current cohorts. To do
this, we first solve for the transition path between the economy with and without Medicare.
This enables us to account for the costs of transiting between the steady states. In particular,
it enables us to account for the costs of accumulating assets to finance the higher cost of
medical expenses in old age.
We start by examining the ex-post welfare effects on consumers in different age brackets.
Our estimates show that the majority of the young would benefit from the policy change due
to the reform’s effect on payroll taxes and wages. The majority of the elderly, on the other
hand, are better off in the economy with Medicare. After summing across all age brackets,
we find that 56.8 percent of the population alive in the period of the reform would benefit
from the elimination of the program.
Next, we quantify the ex-post welfare effects on those that benefit and lose from the
reform by computing the dollar value of how much wealth must change in the initial steady
state to make the consumers weakly better off in the economy with Medicare than in the
transition to the economy without Medicare. We find that those that benefit from the reform
experience an average welfare gain that is equivalent to receiving $3, 600 higher wealth in
the steady state with Medicare. In contrast, those that lose from the reform experience an
average welfare loss that is equivalent to at least a $27, 700 reduction in wealth. As a result,
we find that the elimination of Medicare lowers aggregate welfare, and that the per capita
welfare loss of the reform is equivalent to at least a $9, 900 reduction in wealth in the initial
steady state. Note that this is a lower bound for the welfare loss of the reform. This follows
from the fact that consumers are not allowed to borrow in our model. Consequently, some
consumers will be strictly better off in the economy with Medicare even if they forfeit all of
their current wealth. In this case, we find that the constraint binds for 9.4 percent of the
population.
Lastly, we consider an additional ex-post welfare measure that quantifies the welfare
effect by computing the average consumption equivalent variation across consumers. We
show that our finding that aggregate welfare declines following the elimination of Medicare
is robust to using this alternative welfare measure.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section relates our contribution to the lit-
erature. In section 3 we lay out the environment of our economy and set up a quantitative
life cycle model. This section also presents the different types of health insurance that are
available in the economy. After calibrating the model in section 4, we turn to the policy
experiments. Section 5 starts by studying the macroeconomic effects of eliminating Medi-
care. The section also considers an alternative reform where we eliminate both Medicare and
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Medicaid. Section 6 discusses the robustness of our results to alternative parameterizations
of the model. Lastly, section 7 concludes and gives directions for future research.
3.2 Relation to the literature
This paper is related to several strands of the literature. Our framework is similar to
the one Conesa and Krueger (1999) use to study the aggregate effects of Social Security
reforms. Their model has two essential features for our analysis. First, it takes a life cycle
perspective on consumption, assets, and labor decisions. Second, it accounts for general
equilibrium feedback effects. We extend their model by incorporating idiosyncratic risk to
health and by allowing consumers to enroll in private and public health insurance programs.
We build on the literature that uses overlapping generations models to study the macroe-
conomic effects of health and aging. Attanasio et al. (2010) study the implications of an
aging population for the financing of Medicare, but they do not explicitly model Medicaid,
a program that we show is essential to determine consumers’ saving and insurance behavior
upon changes to Medicare. Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013) study the welfare effects
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). Our model is closely related to
theirs, except that we endogenize the retirement decision, since 20 percent of the population
aged 65 and older are still active in the labor market. Jung and Tran (2016) use a model
with endogenous health to quantify the effects of ACA. They do not, however, study tran-
sitional dynamics. Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Krueger and Ludwig (2016) argue that
a full characterization of the transition path is crucial for policy evaluation. Comparative
statics exercises fail to account for potentially large transitional costs, and hence give at best
a partial picture of the effects of policy reforms. Bairoliya et al. (2017) and İmrohoroğlu
and Zhao (2017) develop overlapping generations models to study health insurance and
social security reforms in China. McGrattan and Prescott (2017) propose an overlapping
generations model to study the impacts of fiscal policies in economies that are undergoing
a demographic change. Lastly, Borella et al. (2017) examine the importance of including
gender and marriage in structural life cycle models.
We also contribute to the literature on precautionary saving and its interaction with
medical expenditure shocks. Hubbard et al. (1994) and Palumbo (1999) study the role of
out-of-pocket medical expenditure risk in life cycle models. De Nardi et al. (2010) find that
accounting for medical expense risk is important in explaining the observed saving of the
elderly.
Lastly, our paper is related to the empirical literature studying social insurance programs.
Finkelstein (2007) and Finkelstein and McKnight (2008) estimate the impact of Medicare on
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insurance coverage, health care utilization, and spending. They find that the introduction of
Medicare increased the share of elderly with insurance coverage by 75 percentage points and
led to a significant reduction in the elderly’s exposure to out-of-pocket medical expenditure
risk. Finally, Michaud et al. (2017) examine the impact of demographic changes on Social
Security Disability Insurance trends.
3.3 Model
The following subsections present the benchmark model used in the analysis. The model
is a discrete time, general equilibrium, overlapping generations model with ex-ante hetero-
geneous consumers, where consumers differ in age, educational level, health status, labor
productivity, assets, and health insurance status.
3.3.1 Consumers
The economy is populated by a continuum of ex-ante consumers. Consumers are indexed
by type s = (j, e, h, η, a, i), where j denotes age, e is educational level, h denotes health
status, η is labor productivity, a denotes assets, and i is the consumer’s health insurance
status. Throughout we let Φ (s) denote the measure of consumers of type s.
The consumer’s educational level can take on one of two values: college or non-college.
For simplicity, we assume that the consumer’s educational level is permanent over her life-
time. Health status is stochastic and depends on the consumer’s current age, education, and
health. It follows a finite-state Markov process with stationary transitions over time:
Qj,e (h,H) = Prob
(
h′ ∈ H : (h, j, e)) . (3.1)
Labor productivity is given by a stationary finite-state Markov process:
Q (η,E) = Prob
(
η′ ∈ E : η) . (3.2)
Lastly, the consumer’s health insurance status specifies if she is self-insured or has private
health insurance, employer-provided health insurance, or health insurance provided by the
government in the form of Medicare. Health insurance is used to cover medical expenses,
mjh, which vary with the consumer’s age and health status.
Consumers are endowed with one unit of time in every period that can be allocated
to work and leisure. We assume that consumers can work in old age. This assumption is
motivated by the observation that nearly 20 percent of individuals aged 65 and older still
participate in the workforce. Labor supply, `, is indivisible and can take on one of four
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values: ` ∈ {0, `p, `f , `e}, where p, f, and e refer to part time, full time, and extra time,
respectively. In addition to leisure, consumers also derive utility from consumption, c. The
period-by-period return function is given by
U (c, `) =
[
cγ(1− `)1−γ
]1−σ
1− σ . (3.3)
Starting at age jr, all consumers receive health insurance from the government in the
form of Medicare. They also receive Social Security benefits SSe that depend on their
education. Lastly, consumers face a survival probability ψjeh that depends on their age,
education, and health. All consumers that survive until age J die with probability one. In
the event of death, the consumer’s assets are uniformly distributed across the population by
means of lump-sum transfers, B.
3.3.2 Health insurance and government welfare programs
This section presents the different types of health insurance that are available in the
economy. As noted earlier, health insurance is available in the form of private insurance,
employer-provided insurance, and Medicare. Health insurance is also provided by the gov-
ernment in the form of Medicaid and a combination of food stamps and basic medical relief
(for brevity, referred to as food stamps below). The consumer’s insurance status determines
what fraction of her medical expenses must be paid out-of-pocket, mop. Throughout, we let
χP , χE , χCARE , and χCAID denote the copayment parameter for private health insurance,
employer-provided health insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid, respectively.
Private health insurance
Consumers can purchase health insurance for the following period from private insurance
companies. We let private insurance companies price-discriminate based on age, education,
and health. We assume that the price is actuarially fair for each insurance pool (j, e, h).
That is, the firm breaks even on each insurance pool. This gives the following expression
for the insurance premium:
pijeh =

ψjeh(1−χP )
∫
mj′h′Qj,e(h,dh′)
(1+r′) if j < jr − 1
ψjeh(1−χP )χCARE
∫
mj′h′Qj,e(h,dh′)
(1+r′) if j ≥ jr − 1.
(3.4)
We assume that Medicare is the primary payer for all elderly consumers. That is, in the
event that a consumer is covered by both Medicare and private insurance, Medicare pays
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first.
Employer-provided health insurance
We assume that a fraction of workers have health insurance provided by their employer.
The employer pools the medical expenses of all their employees that do not choose to go on
food stamps. These costs are then split evenly between all employees that currently work
positive hours. That is, we model employer-provided health insurance as a pay-as-you-go
system where current contributors pay for the health expenditures of current receivers. The
premium is thus given by
p¯iE =
(1− χE)
∫
IF=0mjhΦ
({1, . . . , jr − 1} × de× dh× dη × da× {iE})∫
I`>0Φ ({1, . . . , jr − 1} × de× dh× dη × da× {iE}) , (3.5)
where the indicator function IF=0 in the numerator equals one for all consumers that do
not choose to go on food stamps. We assume that consumers cannot have both employer-
provided and private health insurance, and that consumers cannot opt out of employer-
provided insurance. The latter assumption is needed to alleviate the adverse selection
problem associated with group insurance plans, which would arise in our model due to
our abstracting from tax deductions for employer-provided health insurance premia. Jeske
and Kitao (2009) find that these deductions discourage healthy individuals to opt out of
group insurance in favor of private insurance. Lastly, we assume that consumers aged jr
and older are not eligible for employer-provided health insurance. This is motivated by data
from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey which show that the percentage of individuals
with employer-provided insurance drops from about 50 to 20 percent between the ages of
60 and 70. Since consumers aged jr and older are not eligible for employer-provided health
insurance, we let consumers of age jr−1 with employer-provided insurance purchase private
insurance for the following period.
Medicaid
Medicaid is a means-tested program that provides health insurance to the poor. There
are two ways to qualify for Medicaid. First, consumers are eligible for Medicaid if the sum
of their gross income and interest earnings is below a threshold ycat. Second, consumers
also qualify for Medicaid if the sum of their gross income and interest earnings net of
out-of-pocket medical expenses is below a threshold ymn and their assets are less than
amn. Following Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013), we call the two eligibility criteria
“categorical eligibility” and “eligibility based on medical need,” respectively.
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Medicare
The government also provides health insurance in the form of Medicare. Unlike Medicaid,
Medicare is not a means-tested program, but provides equal health insurance to all the
elderly. Since Medicare does not cover all out-of-pocket medical expenses, elderly consumers
can purchase private insurance as a complementary insurance.
Food stamps and basic medical relief
Finally, the government provides health insurance in the form of a combined food stamps
and basic medical relief program. The program combines institutional features of food
stamps, disability insurance, and basic medical relief for the poor. To qualify for this pro-
gram in the model, consumers have to forfeit all assets and work zero hours. In return,
the government pays for all out-of-pocket medical expenses and guarantees a minimum con-
sumption level, c.
3.3.3 Consumer problem
The consumer’s choice set depends on her current age and insurance status. Throughout,
we use the word young to denote consumers less than age jr and old to denote consumers
that are at least jr years old. We start by presenting the problem of a young consumer
without employer-provided health insurance. This subsection also defines the value of going
on food stamps. Next, we set up the problem faced by young consumers with employer-
provided health insurance. Lastly, we discuss the problem of old consumers.
Young consumers without employer-provided health insurance
Recall that a consumer’s type is given by s = (j, e, h, η, a, i) , where j denotes age, e is
educational level, h denotes health status, η is labor productivity, a denotes assets, and i
is the consumer’s health insurance status. Let V I(s) denote the value of young consumers
without employer-provided health insurance. Similarly, let V F (s) denote the value of food
stamps. Consumers without employer insurance that do not choose to go on food stamps
may or may not purchase private insurance for the following period. This yields the following
problem:
V (s) = max
{
V I (s) , V F (s)
}
, (3.6)
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where V I(s) is given by
V I (s) = max
c,a′,`,i′
U (c, `) + βψjeh
∫∫
V (s′)Q (η, dη′)Qj,e (h, dh′)
s.t. c+ a′ +mop + Ii′=iP pijeh = w (1− τ) jeηξ (h) `
+ (1 + r) (a+B) + IMed(s, `) (1− χCAID)mop
mop = Ii=iPχPmjh + (1− Ii=iP )mjh
` ∈ {0, `p, `f , `e}
c, a′ ≥ 0
i′ ∈ {iP , iS} .
(3.7)
Here, i = iP means the consumer has private health insurance, and i = iS means the
consumer is self-insured. The indicator function, IMed(s, `), equals one if the consumer
qualifies for Medicaid. Medicaid covers a share 1−χCAID of out-of-pocket medical expenses,
which are given by mjh for self-insured consumers and χPmjh for consumers that purchased
private insurance in the preceding period. Lastly, labor earnings depend on the consumer’s
stochastic labor productivity, η, health, ξ (h), and deterministic life cycle productivity, je,
the last of which varies with age and education.
To qualify for food stamps in the model, consumers have to forfeit all assets and work
zero hours. In return, the government covers all out-of-pocket medical expenses and provides
the consumer with consumption c. The value of food stamps is thus given by
V F (s) = U (c, 0) + βψjeh
∫∫
V (s′)Q (η, dη′)Qj,e (h, dh′)
s.t. a′ = 0
i′ = iS .
(3.8)
Young consumers with employer-provided health insurance
Let V E(s) denote the value of being on employer-provided health insurance. Consumers
with employer insurance choose whether or not to go on food stamps. This yields the
following problem:
V (s) = max
{
V E (s) , V F (s)
}
, (3.9)
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where V E(s) is given by
V E (s) = max
c,a′,`
U (c, `) + βψjeh
∫∫
V (s′)Q (η, dη′)Qj,e (h, dh′)
s.t. c+ a′ +mop + I`>0p¯iE = w (1− τ) jeηξ (h) `
+ (1 + r) (a+B) + IMed (s, `) (1− χCAID)mop
mop = χEmjh
` ∈
0, `p, `f , `e if sick`p, `f , `e if healthy
c, a′ ≥ 0
i′ = iE .
(3.10)
Out-of-pocket medical expenses are given by χEmjh for consumers on employer insurance.
All consumers on employer insurance that work positive hours must pay a premium p¯iE . We
assume that healthy consumers on employer insurance have to supply a minimum of `p > 0
hours. Sick consumers, on the other hand, are free to choose zero hours. In the model,
consumers are considered sick if they have a catastrophic health state. Finally, the value of
going on food stamps is the same as above, with the exception that consumers continue to
be eligible for employer-provided insurance in the following period, i′ = iE .
Old consumers
Let V R(s) denote the value of an old consumer of type s. Similarly to young consumers
without employer-provided health insurance, old consumers that do not choose to go on food
stamps may or may not purchase private insurance for the following period. This yields the
following problem:
V (s) = max
{
V R (s) , V F (s)
}
, (3.11)
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where V R(s) is given by
V R (s) = max
c,a′,`,i′
U (c, `) + βψjeh
∫∫
V (s′)Q (η, dη′)Qj,e (h, dh′)
s.t. c+ a′ +mop + Ii′=iP pijeh = w (1− τ) jeηξ(h)`
+ (1 + r) (a+B) + SSe + IMed(s, `) (1− χCAID)mop
mop = Ii=iPχPχCAREmjh + (1− Ii=iP )χCAREmjh
` ∈ {0, `p, `f , `e}
c, a′ ≥ 0
i′ ∈ {iP , iS} .
(3.12)
All consumers start receiving Medicare and Social Security benefits at age jr. Neither pro-
gram is tied to retirement, and hence consumers continue to receive both Medicare and
Social Security benefits even if they choose to work in old age. Out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses are given by χCAREmjh for self-insured consumers and χCAREχPmjh for consumers
that purchased private insurance in the preceding period.
3.3.4 Firms
Firms hire labor at wage w and rent capital at rate r from the consumers to maximize
profits. We assume that the aggregate technology can be represented by a constant returns
to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = θKαN1−α, (3.13)
where θ denotes total factor productivity, K is the aggregate capital stock, N denotes
aggregate labor supply (measured in efficiency units), and α is capital’s share of income.
Output is used for consumption, C, investment, I = K ′ − (1 − δ)K, and to cover medical
expenses, M :
C +M +K ′ = θKαN1−α + (1− δ)K, (3.14)
where δ is the rate of depreciation.
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3.3.5 Government
Let be denote the Social Security replacement rate conditional on the consumer’s educa-
tional level. Social Security benefits SSe then satisfy
SSe =
bewN∫
Φ ({1, . . . , jr − 1} × de× dh× dη × da× di) . (3.15)
The government finances its costs of providing health insurance, food stamps, and Social
Security by means of payroll taxes. For simplicity, we assume that the government balances
its budget period-by-period. Let gov denote the total government expenditure on health
insurance and food stamps. Taxes on labor income, τ, then have to satisfy
τwN = SSe
∫
Φ ({jr, . . . , J} × de× dh× dη × da× di) + gov. (3.16)
3.3.6 Definition of equilibrium
Given a replacement rate be, copayment parameters χP , χE , χCARE, and χCAID, and
initial conditions for capital K1 and the measure of types Φ1, an equilibrium in our model
is a sequence of model variables such that:
1. Given prices, insurance premia, government policies, and accidental bequests, con-
sumers maximize utility subject to their constraints.
2. Factor prices satisfy marginal product pricing conditions.
3. Government policies satisfy the government budget constraint.
4. Goods, factor, and insurance market clearing conditions are met.
5. Aggregate law of motion for Φ is induced by the policy functions and the exogenous
stochastic processes for idiosyncratic risk.
3.4 Calibration
This section describes how we map the model to the data. We start by presenting the
health expenditure data used in this paper. Next, we discuss how we compute the health
insurance copayment parameters, how the Medicaid eligibility criteria are determined, and
how we compute the health transition probabilities. The last two subsections summarize
the calibration of the preference and technology parameters, and the parameters of the
idiosyncratic earnings process.
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3.4.1 Health expenditure
We use data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). The MEPS collects
detailed records on medical expenditure, insurance, income, and demographics for a nation-
ally representative sample of households. The survey consists of two-year overlapping panels
for the period 1996 to 2013, of which we use data from 1996 to 2010 for individuals aged 20
to 85 years. All current price series are converted to 2010 dollars using the GDP deflator.
We split medical expenses into three categories: low, high, and catastrophic. To identify
these expenses in the data, we first pool all medical expenses for each age group and compute
the 60th and 99.9th percentile. We then identify low, high, and catastrophic expenses as
the average value between the 0-60th percentile, the 60-99.9th percentile, and the 99.9-100th
percentile. Next, we assume a logarithmic trend. Since the MEPS pools all medical expenses
for individuals older than 85, we extrapolate medical expenses for consumers aged 85 to 100.
Lastly, we scale the expenditures to match the 16.5 percent health expenditures-to-GDP
ratio observed in the United States between 2006 and 2010. These series are illustrated in
figure 1. We also report how medical expense risk varies over the life cycle. This is illustrated
in figure 2, which shows that both the mean and variance of medical expenses increase as
people age.
3.4.2 Health insurance parameters and Medicaid eligibility criteria
To compute the copayment parameter on private insurance, employer insurance, and
Medicaid, we first derive each consumer’s primary insurance provider, defined as the insurer
that pays for most of the consumer’s expenses. For instance, if Medicaid covers most of
the consumer’s expenses, but she also pays some expenses out-of-pocket, Medicaid will be
her primary insurance provider. We then compute the average share of expenses paid by
Medicaid across consumers with Medicaid as their primary insurance provider, and let the
copayment parameter on Medicaid be given by the complement of this share. The same
method is used to compute the copayment parameter on private insurance and employer
insurance. Given data from the MEPS, we obtain a copayment parameter on private in-
surance and employer insurance of 22.9 percent, and a copayment parameter on Medicaid
of 13.8 percent. We use the same copayment parameter on private and employer insurance
since the MEPS pools expenses covered by these insurance plans.
Recall that all of the elderly receive Medicare in the model and that Medicare is their
primary payer (that is, in the event that an old consumer is covered by multiple insurance
plans, Medicare pays first). An implication of this assumption is that the percentage of
the elderly’s total health expenses that is paid by Medicare will always be equal to the
complement of the Medicare copayment parameter in the model. In other words, using a
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Medicare copayment parameter of x percent means that Medicare will pay for 1−x percent
of the elderly’s total medical expenses. Data from the MEPS show that Medicare pays
for 46.9 percent of the elderly’s total health expenses and for 70.9 percent of the medical
expenses of those with Medicare as their primary insurance provider. To better match the
age-specific insurance distribution in the data, we pick a value closer to the first estimate
and let the copayment parameter on Medicare be 50.0 percent.
Prior to ACA, financial eligibility criteria for Medicaid varied considerably across states,
but were typically well below the federal poverty level (FPL). Data from the Kaiser Family
Foundation show that 33 states had a categorical income limit below the FPL in 2009, which
was about $10, 800, or 23 percent of GDP per capita. The weighted average categorical
income limit, with weights given by each state’s share of total health expenses, was 90.2
percent of the FPL. The categorical income limit in the model is set to match this 90.2
percent weighted average limit. Next, among the 34 states that had a Medicaid medically
needy program in 2009, 30 states had a medically needy income limit below the FPL, and
23 states had a medically needy asset limit below $2, 500. The corresponding weighted
average medically needy income and asset thresholds across the states with a medically
needy program were 41.9 percent of the FPL and $1, 950, respectively. We set the medically
needy income and asset thresholds to match these weighted average limits. A summary of
the health insurance parameters is given in table 1.
3.4.3 Health transition and death probabilities
The health transition matrix must guarantee that, for each age and educational level,
60, 39.9, and 0.1 percent of consumers have low, high, and catastrophic medical expenses,
respectively. Similarly, the survival probabilities must ensure that the age-specific survival
probabilities are consistent with what we observe in the data. The following discussion
explains how we adjust the health transition matrix to ensure consistency with the data.
Using our MEPS sample, we first estimate age, health, and education specific health tran-
sition and survival probabilities by running an ordered probit regression of next period’s
health on current age, age squared, education, health, and interaction terms. Next, we
scale the survival probabilities estimated from the MEPS to match the age-specific survival
probabilities reported by the Social Security Administration. This last step is necessary
since individuals drop out of the MEPS when they become institutionalized, which leads
to upward biased survival probabilities. Lastly, we iterate on the transition matrix until
the probabilities guarantee that, for each age and educational level, the correct percentage
of consumers transition to each health state. That is, we iterate on the transition matrix,
Qj,e (h,H), until xTQj,e (h,H) = xT , where xT = [0.6, 0.399, 0.001] denotes the probability
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distribution of consumers across health states. Note that this is an augmented version of
the RAS-method, which is a method used to generate matrices that satisfy prespecified row
and column sum constraints.
3.4.4 Preference, technology, and life cycle parameters
Consumers enter the model at age 20. We set jr to 47 so that consumers start receiving
Medicare and Social Security benefits at age 66. The maximum life span is set to 100 years.
We follow Conesa and Krueger (1999) and set the population growth rate to 1.1 percent
per year. Together with the estimated survival probabilities, these values give an old age
dependency ratio (that is, the ratio of population older than 65 over population between
20 and 65) of 22.3 percent, slightly more than the 20.9 percent reported by the 2009 U.S.
Census. Capital’s share of income is set to 0.36. We follow CastaÒeda et al. (2003) and
set the depreciation rate to 0.059. We set the consumption share in intratemporal utility to
0.574 to match estimates in French (2005), and set σ to 2.742 to match an intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES) of 0.5. Next, consumers are endowed with one unit of time
in every period that can be allocated to work and leisure. We set the grid for labor supply
to ` ∈ {0, 0.225, 0.300, 0.375}, which corresponds to working zero hours, part time, full time,
and overtime, respectively. We let ξ (h) be equal to 1 for agents with low and high health
expenditures, and 0 for agents with catastrophic expenses. Given data from the MEPS, we
estimate deterministic labor productivity profiles, je, by regressing the logarithm of wages
on age, education, higher-order moments of age, and interaction terms. Lastly, we set the
fraction of consumers with at least a four-year college degree to 23.5 percent and let the
remaining share be denoted as consumers without a college degree to match estimates in the
MEPS. A summary of the non-insurance parameters that are determined outside the model
is given in table 2.
The final set of parameters is determined jointly in equilibrium, a summary of which
is given in table 3. We calibrate θ to generate a steady state GDP per capita of 1 in
the benchmark economy. The discount factor is set to 0.927 to match a capital-to-output
ratio of 3. The low value of the discount factor is attributed to consumers being subject
to idiosyncratic shocks to both labor productivity and health expenditures. Consumers
accordingly save more in our model than in standard life cycle models where consumers
only face shocks to labor productivity. A lower value of β is thus needed to generate the
desired capital-to-output ratio. The Social Security replacement rates are calibrated to
match average Social Security benefits across individuals with and without a college degree.
The assumption that benefits depend on education is motivated by the fact that Social
Security benefits are tied to lifetime earnings in the United States, which is correlated
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with educational attainment. Next, we set the consumption floor, c, to match the average
annual Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits reported by the United States
Department of Agriculture. Lastly, we calibrate the mass of 20-year-olds that qualify for
employer-provided insurance to match the mass of individuals with either private or employer
insurance in the data.
3.4.5 Earnings process
We follow CastaÒeda et al. (2003) and calibrate the parameters of the labor earnings
process to match the empirical earnings distribution in the United States. We choose a
right-skewed productivity shock process to match the top decile of the earnings distribution,
and calibrate the variance of the process to match the dispersion observed in the data. The
comparison of the labor earnings distribution in the model and the data reported in table 4
shows that the model successfully matches the empirical distribution. A similar comparison
of the wealth distribution is given in table 5. Although we do not calibrate the model to
match this distribution, the table verifies that the model generates a concentration and right
skewness of wealth that is comparable to what we observe in the data.
3.5 Results
We use the model to run two policy experiments. We start by studying the macroeco-
nomic effects of eliminating Medicare from the benchmark economy. We then analyze an
alternative reform where we eliminate both Medicare and Medicaid.
Before we present the policy experiments, we first evaluate the performance of the model
by comparing the distribution of medical expenses by age and provider in the model and the
data. Figure 3 shows that the benchmark model captures several features of the age-specific
insurance distribution in the MEPS. The model is consistent with the fact that medical
expenses in young age are largely paid out-of-pocket, by Medicaid, and by private and
employer-provided insurance plans, and that the majority of expenses in old age are covered
by Medicare. Quantitatively, the model also largely matches the percentage of expenses
covered by Medicare, private, and employer-provided insurance plans over the life cycle.
The model underestimates the expenses paid out-of-pocket and overestimates the expenses
covered by Medicaid. The latter discrepancy between the model and the data is partly
driven by the Medicaid income tests. Recall that we set the categorical and medically needy
income thresholds to match the 90.2 and 41.9 percent weighted average limits in the data,
respectively. The corresponding median categorical and medically needy income thresholds
are 64.0 and 50.5 percent. Using the median rather than weighted mean income limits in the
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model lowers the percentage of expenses covered by Medicaid for the young and increases
the corresponding share for the old. We choose the weighted mean estimates to better match
the insurance distribution of the elderly. A sensitivity analysis reported in section 6 shows
that our results are robust to using median income and asset tests. With easier access to
Medicaid, however, a larger share of the elderly is able to substitute into Medicaid. As a
result, the saving to the government from eliminating Medicare is only 44 cents on the dollar
in the model with median income and asset limits, in contrast to 46 cents on the dollar with
weighted average limits. Lastly, figure 3 shows that other insurance programs cover about 7
percent of health expenses of all age groups in the data. In the model, this insurance plan
corresponds to our combined food stamps and basic medical relief program. We find that
the share of health expenses paid by this program declines with age and approaches zero for
the elderly, a result that follows directly from the assumption that consumers have to forfeit
all assets and work zero hours to qualify for the program.
3.5.1 Eliminating Medicare
Our first policy experiment involves an unexpected elimination of Medicare. Starting
from the benchmark economy, we lower the insurance coverage rate of Medicare to zero
and study the macroeconomic effects as the economy transitions to a new steady state
without Medicare. By “macroeconomic effects,” we mean the effects of the policy reform on
consumption, assets, output, insurance choice, government spending, and welfare. We study
not only comparative statics but also the full transition path between the economies, which
Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Krueger and Ludwig (2016) have shown to be crucial for
evaluating Social Security and education policy reforms.
Macroeconomic aggregates, insurance enrollment, and government spending
Table 6 compares the steady state of the economy with and without Medicare. Elimi-
nating Medicare leads to a 2.7 percentage point reduction in payroll taxes and a 1.3 percent
increase in wages. The increase in wages follows from the 4.4 percent increase in capital
per capita. Capital increases as consumers raise their saving to finance the higher cost of
medical expenses in old age. The combination of higher wages and lower payroll taxes raises
labor supply and generates an increase in output per capita of 2.0 percent.
Table 7 reports the insurance distributions in the two steady states. As consumers are
allowed to combine health insurance policies (for instance, an old consumer on Medicare can
purchase private insurance), we define a consumer’s main insurance provider as the insurance
plan that pays for the largest share of her medical expenses. For instance, a consumer is
defined to be on employer-provided health insurance if most of her medical expenses are paid
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by the employer. The table also reports the percentage of total medical expenses covered by
each insurance plan. Note that total health expenses are equal in the two economies since all
medical spending is non-discretionary in the model. In the benchmark economy, 18.2 percent
of consumers have Medicare as their primary health insurance provider. Not surprisingly,
eliminating Medicare increases the percentage of self-insured consumers and the fraction of
consumers with private insurance as their main provider. More interestingly, we find that
the policy reform raises the percentage of consumers with Medicaid as their primary health
insurance provider from 16.4 to 20.8 percent. As Medicaid coverage increases, total medical
expenses covered by Medicaid also rises from 22.1 to 32.3 percent.
Figure 4, which plots Medicaid enrollment by age in the economy with and without
Medicare, shows that all of the increase in the Medicaid coverage rate is driven by the elderly,
who respond to the removal of Medicare by partially substituting Medicaid for Medicare. To
better understand how Medicare affects Medicaid enrollment, we compute the percentage
of people in each age bracket that qualify for Medicaid under the categorical and medically
needy criterion in the two economies. Recall that consumers qualify for Medicaid under
the categorical criterion if the sum of their gross income and interest earnings is below the
categorical threshold. Similarly, consumers qualify for Medicaid under the medically needy
criterion if the sum of their gross income and interest earnings net of out-of-pocket medical
expenses and their assets are both below the corresponding limits. Given our calibration
of the categorical income limit and Social Security replacement rates, none of the elderly
qualify for Medicaid under the categorical criterion in the two economies. All of the increase
in the Medicaid coverage rate is thus driven by an increase in the percentage of elderly that
qualifies under the medically needy criterion because the reform lowers the elderly’s net
income. Note that net income declines even though the elderly respond to the reform by
increasing their labor supply, saving, and purchase of private health insurance.
Medicare spending accounts for 3.3 percent of GDP in the benchmark economy, about
$489 billion. How much the government saves by eliminating the program depends on what
happens to spending on other social insurance programs such as Medicaid, food stamps,
and Social Security. Table 8 decomposes fiscal spending on these programs in the economy
with and without Medicare. Eliminating Medicare leads to a rise in Medicaid expenses from
$545 to $796 billion as the share of old consumers that qualify for the program increases.
It also raises the fraction of elderly that goes on food stamps, but total spending on the
program remains constant at $94 billion since fewer young consumers go on food stamps
in the economy without Medicare. Lastly, government spending on Social Security benefits
increases from $699 to $714 billion as wages surge following the rise in capital. These
estimates show that government spending on other social insurance programs increases by
76
$266 billion following the reform. As a result, we find that the elimination of Medicare
leads to a $223 billion annual reduction in fiscal spending. Accordingly, although Medicare
spending accounts for 3.3 percent of GDP in the benchmark economy, the reform only results
in a 1.5 percentage point reduction in government spending in the long run.
The $223 billion annual reduction in fiscal spending following the $489 billion cut in
Medicare spending shows that the government saves only 46 cents for every dollar it cuts
on Medicare expenses. Our results also show that most of the loss in saving following the
reform can be attributed to spending on Medicaid. Put together, these findings suggest
that for every dollar the government cuts on Medicare, spending on Medicaid increases by
51 cents. Consequently, eliminating Medicare will have only limited long-run fiscal effects if
the current Medicaid eligibility criteria are maintained.
Recall that total health expenses are equal in the two economies and that the $489 billion
cut in Medicare expenses leads to an increase in Medicaid spending by $251. The remaining
$238 billion increase in health spending can be attributed to private insurance, self-insurance,
employer insurance, and food stamps. We find that the elderly partially respond to the
reform by purchasing private health insurance, which in turn increases spending by private
insurance from $296 to $388 billion. Similarly, the increase in the percentage of self-insured
consumers leads to a surge in out-of-pocket medical spending from $565 to $706. Lastly,
spending by employer insurance increases from $472 to $476 billion, and spending by food
stamps increases from $100 to $101 billion. Note that total health expenses covered by food
stamps exceed total government spending on food stamps since consumers have to forfeit
all assets to qualify for the program.
We next examine the transition path between the economy with and without Medicare.
We choose a transition duration of 100 years to ensure that the economy has sufficient time
to transition to the new steady state. Starting from an initial steady state with Medicare,
figure 5 shows how capital, output, consumption, and effective labor supply evolve during
the first 50 years following the elimination of the program. Although the comparative statics
exercise in table 6 showed that consumption per capita is 1.8 percent higher in the steady
state without Medicare, the transition path shows that consumption initially drops by about
0.7 percent. In fact, the percentage change in consumption compared to the initial steady
state remains negative for several years following the elimination of Medicare. Consumption
declines during the transition as consumers accumulate assets to finance the higher cost of
medical expenses in old age. As we have shown earlier, the surge in capital leads to higher
wages and labor supply, both of which enable the consumers to save and consume more in
the long run.
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Welfare
This section quantifies the ex-ante and ex-post welfare effects of the reform. While the
ex-ante measure refers to the effect on an unborn consumer under the veil of ignorance, the
ex-post measure refers to the effect on the current cohorts.
Ex-ante welfare We quantify the ex-ante welfare effect by means of consumption equiva-
lent variation. That is, we measure how much a consumer’s consumption must increase in all
periods and contingencies in the economy with Medicare to make her indifferent between the
economy with and without Medicare. Let VM (s) denote the value of a consumer of type s in
the steady state with Medicare. Similarly, let V Nt (s) denote the value of a consumer of type
s that enters the economy in period t of the transition. Finally, let Φ0 (s) = Φ (1, e, h, η, 0, i)
denote the mass of newborns of type s. Given our functional form for utility, we obtain the
following expression for the ex-ante welfare effect on an unborn consumer under the veil of
ignorance that enters the economy in period t of the transition:
CEV Trt =
[ ∫
V Nt (s) Φ0 (ds)∫
VM (s) Φ0 (ds)
] 1
γ(1−σ)
. (3.17)
Figure 6 shows how ex-ante welfare evolves during the first 50 years of the transition.
That is, it shows how much consumption must increase in all periods and contingencies in
the economy with Medicare to make an unborn consumer under the veil of ignorance that
enters the economy in period t of the transition indifferent between the benchmark economy
and the transition. We find that ex-ante welfare increases by 2.1 percent for a consumer
that enters in the first period of the reform. This welfare gain further increases over the
transition. Consequently, we find that ex-ante welfare increases by 3.6 percent in the long
run. Ex-ante welfare is higher without Medicare because payroll taxes are lower and wages
are higher in the economy without Medicare, both of which facilitate higher consumption
and saving.
Ex-post welfare For unborn cohorts, we do not need to compare utility across different
consumers. Once a consumer is born, however, she begins as either college educated or
non-college educated, and either has or does not have employer-provided health insurance.
As life progresses, the consumer experiences a sequence of shocks to her health status and
labor productivity. Furthermore, at any point in time there are consumers of different ages.
Consequently, if we want to calculate some sort of aggregate ex-post welfare measure of the
impact of eliminating Medicare, we have to compare gains and losses across very different
consumers.
We use three alternative measures to quantify the ex-post welfare effect on the current
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cohorts. None of them are perfect, and we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of
each measure. Our first measure avoids the problem of comparing gains and losses across
different consumers by simply computing the mass of people that benefit from the reform.
This measure tells us whether or not the reform would win on a vote among all consumers
aged 20 and older in the period that the reform is implemented.
For our second measure, we compute the dollar value of how much wealth must change
in the initial steady state to make the consumer weakly better off in the economy with
Medicare than in the transition. Given that consumers are not allowed to borrow, there
exists a lower bound for this change in wealth. For instance, consider a consumer that is
better off in the economy with Medicare. Since wealth must be non-negative, there might
not exist a sufficiently large reduction in wealth that would make this consumer indifferent
between the economy with and without Medicare. For each type s, we therefore compute
the minimum change in wealth, WEV 1 (s), that satisfies the following constraints:
min WEV 1 (s)
s.t. VM
(
j, e, h, η, a+WEV 1 (s) , i
) ≥ V N1 (j, e, h, η, a, i)
a+B +WEV 1 (s) ≥ 0.
(3.18)
We then compute the average welfare effect of the reform by integrating across consumers:
WEV 1 =
∫
WEV 1 (s) Φ (ds) . (3.19)
Finally, for our third measure, we follow Chatterjee et al. (2007) and quantify the
ex-post welfare effects by computing the average consumption equivalent variation across
consumers. To do this, we first compute the percentage change in consumption in all periods
and contingencies that is needed to make a consumer of type s indifferent between the two
economies:
CEV (s) =
[
V N1 (s)
VM (s)
] 1
γ(1−σ)
, (3.20)
where VM (s) and V N1 (s) denote the value of a consumer of type s in the steady state with
Medicare and in the first period of the transition, respectively. We then compute the average
welfare effect of the reform by integrating across consumers:
CEV =
∫
CEV (s) Φ (ds) . (3.21)
Unlike the second measure, this measure does not control for consumers’ different levels of
initial consumption, different assets, or different length of their remaining lifetime.
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We start by examining how support for the policy varies with age. This is illustrated in
figure 7, which plots the percentage of consumers in different age brackets that would vote
in favor of eliminating Medicare. Our result shows that the majority of young consumers
are better off without Medicare. In particular, we find that the percentage of votes by age
in favor of eliminating the program exceeds 50 percent for all ages up to the age of 48.
This result is due to the wage and tax effect discussed earlier. Although it takes time to
transition to the new steady state, these consumers are still young enough to reap most of
the benefits associated with higher labor earnings. The majority of older consumers, on the
other hand, are better off with Medicare. Note, however, that the percentage of votes by age
in favor of eliminating the program does not decline monotonically with age. We find that
the percentage of consumers that are better off without Medicare increases late in life. This
is driven by the interplay between Medicare and Medicaid highlighted earlier. That is, more
old consumers qualify for Medicaid in the economy without Medicare, which in turn lowers
their cost of going through the transition. After summing across votes, we find that 56.8
percent of the population alive in the period of the reform is better off without Medicare.
That is, the majority of the population would vote in favor of eliminating the program.
Next, we turn to our second welfare measure, which quantifies the ex-post welfare effect
by computing the dollar value of how much wealth must change in the initial steady state to
make the consumer weakly better off in the economy with Medicare than in the transition.
We then compute the average change in welfare across the population that would benefit
and lose from the elimination of Medicare by summing across consumers in the two groups.
Our estimate shows that the winners experience an average welfare gain that is equivalent
to receiving $3, 600 higher wealth in the steady state with Medicare. In contrast, the losers
experience an average welfare loss that is equivalent to at least a $27, 700 reduction in
wealth. The average welfare gain across the 56.8 percent of the population that would
benefit from the elimination of Medicare is thus considerably lower than the average welfare
loss experienced by the remaining population. As a result, we find that the elimination
of Medicare lowers aggregate welfare, and that the per capita welfare loss of the reform is
equivalent to at least a $9, 900 reduction in wealth in the initial steady state. Recall that
this measure binds for some consumers. That is, some consumers will be strictly better off
in the economy with Medicare even if they forfeit all of their current wealth. In this case,
we find that the constraint binds for 9.4 percent of the population.
Finally, in terms of consumption equivalent variation, we find that the winners experience
an average welfare gain that is equivalent to receiving 1.9 percent higher consumption in
all periods and contingencies in the initial steady state, and that the losers experience an
average welfare loss of 7.0 percent. When we average the percentage gains and losses across
80
all consumer types, we find that the average change in the different consumption equivalent
variations is a decline of 2.0 percent.
Our discussion so far has shown that the majority of the population alive in the period
of the reform is better off without Medicare. Yet, aggregate welfare is higher in the bench-
mark economy since the welfare gain experienced by those that benefit from the reform is
outweighed by the welfare loss experienced by the rest of the population. The remaining
part of this section studies how these heterogeneous welfare effects vary across consumers
in different health and educational states, and across consumers with different wealth and
labor earnings, a summary of which is given in table 9.
We find that the majority of college and non-college educated consumers are better off
without Medicare, but that both groups experience a reduction in average welfare following
the elimination of the program. Next, our results show that 56.3, 57.5, and 61.8 percent
of consumers with low, high, and catastrophic medical expenses, respectively, are better off
without Medicare. This follows from the fact that the majority of young consumers in all
three health states benefit from the reform, which can be confirmed by examining the age-
and health-specific voting outcomes reported in figure 8. Although the majority of con-
sumers in all three health states benefit from the reform, their average welfare nevertheless
declines. In particular, we find that consumers with low, high, and catastrophic medical
expenses, respectively, experience an average welfare loss that is equivalent to receiving at
least $10, 300, $9, 400, and $1, 400 lower wealth in the steady state with Medicare. The
finding that welfare declines by less for consumers in catastrophic health, which also holds
under our third welfare measure, is driven by the fact that most of these consumers are
covered by food stamps or Medicaid. As shown in table 10, 72.1 percent of consumers with
catastrophic medical expenses are enrolled in food stamps or Medicaid in the steady state
with Medicare. This lowers the insurance value provided by Medicare to these consumers,
which in turn lowers their welfare loss from the reform.
Lastly, we examine how welfare varies with wealth and labor earnings. Whereas the
majority of consumers in the first four wealth quintiles are better off without Medicare,
only 14.2 percent of consumers in the top wealth quintile benefit from the reform. This
is largely driven by the observation that consumers at the top of the wealth distribution
are older on average than consumers at the bottom of the wealth distribution. Moreover,
the latter group is more likely to qualify for Medicaid, which in turn lowers their cost of
eliminating Medicare. Finally, we find that about 70 percent of consumers in the second,
third, and fourth labor earnings quintile benefit from the reform. In contrast, the majority
of consumers in the first and fifth quintile of the earnings distribution are better off with
Medicare.
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3.5.2 Eliminating Medicare and Medicaid
The preceding subsection identified an important relation between Medicare and Medi-
caid. In particular, we found that the percentage of old consumers that qualified for Med-
icaid was higher in the economy without Medicare. A large share of the elderly therefore
responded to the policy reform by substituting Medicaid for Medicare, which in turn low-
ered their cost of going through the transition. The substitutability between Medicare and
Medicaid also implied that the elimination of Medicare would have limited long-run fiscal
implications if the current Medicaid eligibility criteria were maintained. Given these find-
ings, we therefore end this section with a brief analysis of the macroeconomic effects of
eliminating both Medicare and Medicaid. Starting from the benchmark economy, we lower
the Medicare and Medicaid insurance coverage rates to zero and study the effects as the
economy transitions to its new steady state.
Eliminating both programs leads to a 37.8 percent surge in capital per capita as con-
sumers accumulate assets to finance the higher cost of medical expenses throughout their
life. This almost ninefold increase in capital compared to what we found when we only
eliminated Medicare highlights Medicaid’s significant insurance role in the economy. The
combination of 11.0 percent higher wages and 10.0 percentage points lower payroll taxes
raises labor supply and generates an increase in output per capita of 14.5 percent.
Table 7 showed that eliminating Medicare increases the percentage of expenses paid by
private insurance plans from 12.0 to 15.7 percent. Eliminating Medicaid further increases
this fraction to 43.2 percent. This shows that public insurance crowds out private insur-
ance in the economy by discouraging consumers from purchasing insurance. Similar results
are reported by Cutler and Gruber (1996), who estimate the extent of private insurance
crowd-out following the 1987-1992 expansion of Medicaid eligibility to pregnant women and
children.
Our estimates show that public spending declines by $777 billion on impact when we
eliminate Medicare and Medicaid, about 75 percent of the $1.03 trillion the government
spends on these programs in the benchmark economy. As the economy approaches the
new steady state, we find that the reform leads to an $832 billion annual reduction in
fiscal spending. This additional long-run reduction in public expenditures can be attributed
to spending on food stamps, which increases during the first years of the transition but
eventually declines following the surge in saving, the last of which raises the relative cost of
going on food stamps in the model.
Next, we examine the ex-ante welfare effect of the reform, and find that ex-ante welfare
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is higher in the economy without Medicare and Medicaid. In particular, we find that con-
sumption has to increase by 7.8 percent in all periods and contingencies in the steady state
with Medicare and Medicaid to make an unborn consumer under the veil of ignorance indif-
ferent between the two steady states. That said, this measure fails to account for the costs
of transiting between the steady states. It also abstracts from the reform’s heterogeneous
welfare effects on consumers of different types. After accounting for these costs, we find that
eliminating Medicare and Medicaid lowers aggregate welfare, and that the per capita welfare
loss of the reform is equivalent to at least a $29, 500 reduction in wealth in the initial steady
state. As noted earlier, this measure binds for some consumers. That is, some consumers
will be strictly better off in the initial steady state with Medicare and Medicaid even if
they forfeit all of their current wealth. We find that the constraint binds for 37.4 percent of
the population. Finally, we find that 19.4 percent of the population alive in the period of
the reform is better off without both Medicare and Medicaid. That is, the majority of the
population would not vote in favor of eliminating both programs. While our previous result
showed that young consumers would benefit from the elimination of Medicare, we find that
the majority of all age groups would be worse off if both programs were to be removed.
3.6 Sensitivity analysis
We have conducted a wide range of sensitivity analyses, and we find that our main results
are robust. That is, the findings that aggregate ex-post welfare declines if we eliminate
Medicare, that old consumers partially substitute Medicaid for Medicare, and that part of
the reduction in government spending from eliminating Medicare is offset by higher spending
on other social insurance programs are robust to alternative parameterizations of the model.
We limit our discussion here to two robustness checks. First, we consider an alternative
parameterization of the model where we lower the Medicare copayment parameter. Then
we examine the implications of using median rather than weighted mean Medicaid income
and asset limits. In both cases we recalibrate the model to match the same targets as
in section 4. A comparison of the macroeconomic effects of eliminating Medicare under
different parameterizations of the model is given in table 11.
Lower Medicare copayment parameter The copayment parameter for Medicare was
set to match the age-specific insurance distribution in the data. Here we consider an al-
ternative parameterization of the model where we set the Medicare copayment parameter
to match the average share of expenses paid by Medicare across individuals with Medicare
as their primary insurance provider. Given data from the MEPS, we obtain a Medicare
copayment parameter of 29.1 percent.
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Lowering the Medicare copayment parameter from 50.0 to 29.1 percent increases the
percentage of medical expenses paid by Medicare from 19.8 to 28.1 percent. This increase can
be attributed to a reduction in the percentage of expenses paid out-of-pocket, by Medicaid,
and by private insurance. Higher Medicare expenses translate into higher payroll taxes in
the initial steady state of this economy. As a result, we find that eliminating Medicare leads
to a 4.0 percentage points reduction in payroll taxes in this economy, compared to the 2.7
percentage points reduction in payroll taxes reported in section 5.1.
We find that our result regarding how much the government will save by eliminating
the program is robust to this alternative parameterization of the model. Whereas the gov-
ernment saves 46 cents for every dollar it cuts on Medicare in the benchmark model, it
saves 49 cents for every dollar it cuts on Medicare in this model. Our finding that 56.4
and 56.8 percent of the population alive in the period of the reform would benefit from the
elimination of Medicare in this model and in the benchmark model, respectively, also shows
that the welfare implications of eliminating Medicare are comparable in the two models.
That said, using a lower Medicare copayment parameter further increases the elderly’s cost
of going through the transition. As a result, we find that the per capita welfare loss of the
reform is equivalent to at least a $14, 700 reduction in wealth in the initial steady state
under this parameterization of the model, compared to at least a $9, 900 reduction under
the benchmark parameterization.
Median Medicaid income and asset limits We end this section by studying the ef-
fects of eliminating Medicare in a model with median rather than weighted mean Medicaid
income limits. That is, we set the categorical income limit to match the 64.0 percent me-
dian categorical income limit across states, and set the medically needy income and asset
thresholds to match the 50.5 percent and $2, 000 median medically needy income and asset
limit across the states with a medically needy program.
Using median rather than weighted mean Medicaid eligibility limits increases the per-
centage of elderly that qualifies for Medicaid in the model, which in turn lowers their cost
of going through the transition. As a result, we find that the aggregate welfare loss from
eliminating Medicare is higher in the benchmark model than in the model with median Med-
icaid eligibility limits. In particular, we find that the per capita welfare loss of the reform
is equivalent to at least a $9, 500 reduction in wealth in the initial steady state under this
parameterization of the model, slightly less than the $9, 900 reduction reported in section
5.1. Next, we find that the majority of the population alive in the period of the reform would
benefit from the elimination of Medicare under both parameterizations of the model. While
56.8 percent of the population would vote for the policy reform in the benchmark model,
we find that 56.6 percent of the population would benefit from the elimination of Medicare
84
in the model with median Medicaid eligibility thresholds. Lastly, our results show that the
fiscal implications of the policy reform are similar in the two models. Recall from section
5.1 that the government saves 46 cents for every dollar it cuts on Medicare expenses. In
comparison, we find that the government saves 44 cents for every dollar it cuts on Medicare
in the model with median Medicaid eligibility limits.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper has developed an overlapping generations model to study the role of Medi-
care in the macroeconomy. We used the model to quantify the effects of an unexpected
elimination of Medicare on macroeconomic aggregates, insurance enrollment, government
spending, and welfare. We found that a large share of the elderly responded to the reform
by substituting Medicaid for Medicare, which in turn increased spending on Medicaid from
3.6 to 5.3 percent of GDP. Spending on Social Security benefits also increased from 4.7 to
4.8 percent of GDP due to a rise in wages following an increase in capital. As a result, we
found that the government saved only 46 cents for every dollar it cut on Medicare.
We then examined the welfare effects of the reform, and found that ex-ante welfare was
higher in the steady state without Medicare. In particular, we found that consumption
had to increase by 3.6 percent in all periods and contingencies in the steady state with
Medicare to make an unborn consumer under the veil of ignorance indifferent between the
two economies.
Lastly, we have examined the ex-post welfare effects of the reform on the current cohorts.
Our estimates showed that the majority of young consumers would benefit from the policy
change due to the reform’s effect on wages and payroll taxes. The majority of the elderly,
on the other hand, were better off in the economy with Medicare. After summing across all
age brackets, we found that 56.8 percent of the population alive in the period of the reform
would benefit from the elimination of Medicare. Finally, we showed that the average welfare
gain across the winners of the reform was considerably lower than the average welfare loss
experienced by the remaining population. As a result, we found that the elimination of
Medicare lowered aggregate welfare, and that the per capita welfare loss of the reform was
equivalent to at least a $9, 900 reduction in wealth in the initial steady state.
We have also studied an alternative policy reform where we eliminated both Medicare and
Medicaid. The elimination of both programs led to a surge in capital and labor supply, which
in turn increased output per capita by 14.5 percent. It also resulted in a 31.2 percentage
points increase in private insurance coverage and a 10.0 percentage points reduction in
payroll taxes. Lastly, we found that the reform lowered aggregate ex-post welfare, and that
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only 19.4 percent of the population alive in the period of the reform was better off in the
economy without Medicare and Medicaid.
This paper has abstracted from two channels that are likely to influence our results.
First, we did not account for demographic changes in the model. In particular, we did not
account for the projected increase in the old age dependency ratio, which will raise the
future fiscal burden of Medicare. Second, the health-expenditure-to-GDP ratio has risen
steadily since the 1960s and is projected to continue to increase in the future. To overcome
the future fiscal pressure from Medicare and Medicaid, the government will have to raise
taxes, lower the public insurance coverage rates, or change the eligibility rules, an example
of which would be to increase the age at which individuals can claim Medicare. We leave it
to future work to address how our results regarding the macroeconomic effects of Medicare
are affected by these channels.
We also leave it to future research to examine two additional extensions of our paper:
optimal fiscal policy and a small open economy framework. The optimal fiscal policy ap-
proach can be used to identify ways to finance the transition from an economy with Medicare
to an economy without Medicare where the new equilibrium is constrained Pareto optimal.
Conesa and Garriga (2008) use this approach to study Social Security reforms and find that
cohort-specific labor income taxes can be used to shift the welfare gains between present and
future generations. Lastly, we considered a closed economy where accumulation of assets
leads to an increase in the wage rate, which increases the welfare for an unborn consumer
under the veil of ignorance. Future research should examine how our results would change if
we instead considered a small open economy framework where the increase in accumulation
of assets may not increase the wage rate.
Table I: Insurance parameters determined outside the model
Parameter Description Source Value
χP Private insurance copayment parameter MEPS 0.229
χE Employer insurance copayment parameter MEPS 0.229
χCARE Medicare copayment parameter MEPS 0.500
χCAID Medicaid copayment parameter MEPS 0.138
ycat Categorical income limit Kaiser Family Foundation 0.197
ymn Medically needy income limit Kaiser Family Foundation 0.092
amn Medically needy asset limit Kaiser Family Foundation 0.041
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Table II: Non-insurance parameters determined outside the model
Parameter Description Source Value
J Maximum life span (100 years) 81
jr Age for SS and Medicare (66 years) 47
Population growth rate Conesa and Krueger (1999) 0.011
α Capital income share 0.360
δ Depreciation rate CastaÒeda et al. (2003) 0.059
γ Consumption share in utility French (2005) 0.574
σ IES = 0.5 2.742
`p 0.225
`f Indivisible labor 0.300
`e 0.375
ξ(h) Health-specific labor productivity 1,1,0
Fraction of consumers with college degree MEPS 0.235
Table III: Parameters determined jointly in equilibrium
Parameter Description Target Value
θ Total factor productivity GDP pc = 1 0.647
β Discount factor Capital/output = 3 0.927
bc SS replacement rate Average SS benefits college ≈ $14, 200 0.374
bnc SS replacement rate Average SS benefits non-college ≈ $11, 900 0.313
c Consumption floor Average food stamps ≈ $1, 300 0.028
Employer insurance Share with private or employer = 0.508 0.464
Scale for health care costs Health expenditure/output = 0.165 1.803
ση Variance Labor earnings Gini = 0.630 4.051
ηtop Productivity at the top Labor earnings top 1% = 0.148 24.657
pitop Probability at the top Labor earnings top 10% = 0.435 0.004
ρn Persistence 2-year persistence: Bottom 80% = 0.940 0.901
ρtop Persistence at the top 2-year persistence: Top 1% = 0.580 0.775
Table IV: Labor earnings distribution (percent)
Quintiles Top
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100 Gini
Data -0.40 3.19 12.49 23.33 61.39 12.38 16.37 14.76 0.63
Benchmark 0.26 4.79 9.79 20.59 64.56 11.83 16.77 14.78 0.63
w/o Medicare 0.42 5.20 9.82 20.44 64.13 11.75 16.65 14.67 0.62
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Table V: Wealth distribution (percent)
Quintiles Top
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100 Gini
Data -0.39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49 12.62 23.95 29.55 0.78
Benchmark 0.22 0.48 4.93 18.27 76.10 15.98 25.79 15.15 0.75
w/o Medicare 0.22 0.46 4.43 17.80 77.09 16.33 26.26 15.24 0.75
Table VI: Comparative statics: Economy with and without Medicare
Variable Without Medicare
(percentage change from benchmark)
y Output pc 2.0
k Capital pc 4.4
h Avg hours 2.1
c Consumption pc 1.8
N Effective labor pc 0.7
w Wage rate 1.3
(percentage point change from benchmark)
τ Tax rate -2.7
r Interest rate -0.3
Table VII: Insurance distribution and medical expenses
Head count by main provider Medical expense
(percent of population) (percent of total medical expenses)
Benchmark Without Medicare Benchmark Without Medicare
Private 8.6 15.1 12.0 15.7
Employer 33.0 33.3 19.2 19.3
Self 18.8 26.1 22.9 28.6
Medicare 18.2 0.0 19.8 0.0
Medicaid 16.4 20.8 22.1 32.3
FS+MR 5.0 4.7 4.0 4.1
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Table VIII: Fiscal implications
Spending (percent of GDP)
Benchmark Without Medicare
Medicare 3.3 0.0
Medicaid 3.6 5.3
Social Security 4.7 4.8
FS+MR 0.6 0.6
Table IX: Ex-post welfare effects
Variable Votes in favor (%) WEV 1 (dollars) CEV (percent)
Entire population 56.8 −9, 900 -2.0
Winners and losers
Winners 100.0 3, 600 1.8
Losers 0.0 −27, 700 -7.0
Education
Non-college 56.2 −9, 300 -2.0
College 58.6 −12, 100 -1.8
Medical expenses
Low 56.3 −10, 300 -2.0
High 57.5 −9, 400 -2.0
Catastrophic 61.8 −1, 400 -1.2
Wealth (quintile)
1st 70.6 1, 000 -1.6
2nd 77.6 2, 800 0.2
3rd 71.8 −1, 800 -0.3
4th 51.9 −10, 700 -2.7
5th 14.2 −39, 600 -5.2
Labor earnings (quintile)
1st 40.1 −16, 600 -5.6
2nd 69.5 −4, 500 -0.8
3rd 70.2 −900 0.1
4th 68.8 −6, 000 -0.5
5th 36.0 −21, 400 -2.8
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Table X: Medicaid and food stamps enrollment by health in steady state with Medicare
(percent of population)
Health Medicaid Food stamps
Low 12.6 4.9
High 37.4 5.1
Catastrophic 28.0 44.1
Table XI: Comparative statics: Effect of eliminating Medicare under different parameteri-
zations of the model
Variable Benchmark Lower Medicare copay Median Medicaid limits
y Output pc 2.0 3.1 1.8
k Capital pc 4.4 7.1 4.0
h Avg hours 2.1 3.2 1.7
c Consumption pc 1.8 2.6 1.5
N Effective labor pc 0.7 1.0 0.6
w Wage rate 1.3 2.1 1.2
τ Tax rate -2.7 -4.0 -2.5
r Interest rate -0.3 -0.4 -0.3
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Figure 3.1: Medical expenses by age and health state (MEPS)
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100 
no
rm
al
iz
ed
 b
y 
gd
p 
pc
 
age 
catastrophic 
low 
high 
Figure 3.2: Medical expense risk by age (MEPS)
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Figure 3.3: Distribution of medical expenses by age and provider
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Figure 3.4: Medicaid enrollment by age
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Figure 3.5: Transition from economy with Medicare to economy without: Aggregates
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Figure 3.6: Transition from economy with Medicare to economy without: Ex-ante welfare
on unborn consumer
2 
2.2 
2.4 
2.6 
2.8 
3 
3.2 
3.4 
3.6 
3.8 
4 
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
years 
Figure 3.7: Percentage of votes in favor of reform by age
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Figure 3.8: Percentage of votes in favor of reform by age and health
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
Table A.1: Primary commodities SITC Rev.2 classification
Code Commodity description
00 Live animals chiefly for food
01 Meat and meat preparations
02 Dairy products and birds’ eggs
03 Fish, crustaceans, mollucs, preparations thereof
041 Wheat and meslin, unmilled
042 Rice
043 Barley, unmilled
044 Maize (corn), unmilled
045 Cereals, unmilled (no wheat, rice, barley or maize)
05 Vegetables and fruit
06 Sugar, sugar preparations and honey
0711 Coffee green, roasted; coffee substitutes containing coffee
0721 Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted
074 Tea and mate
075 Spices
121 Tobacco unmanufactured; tobacco refuse
08 Feeding stuff for animals, not included unmilled cereals
21 Hides, skins and furskins, raw
22 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit
232 Natural rubber latex; nat. rubber and sim. nat. gums
244 Cork, natural, raw and waste (including in blocks/sheets)
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Table A.1: (continued)
Code Commodity description
245 Fuel wood (excluding wood waste) and wood charcoal
246 Pulpwood (including chips and wood waste)
247 Other wood in the rough or roughly squared
261 Silk
263 Cotton
264 Jute, other textile bast fibres, n.e.s., raw, processed but not spun
265 Vegetable textile fibres and waste of such fibres
268 Wool and other animal hair (excluding wool tops)
27 Crude fertilizers and crude materials (excluding coal)
281 Iron ore and concentrates
286 Ores and concentrates of uranium and thorium
287 Ores and concentrates of base metals, n.e.s.
288 Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap, n.e.s.
289 Ores and concentrates of precious metals, waste, scrap
28901 Ores and concentrates of precious metals
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s.
32 Coal, coke and briquettes
333 Crude petroleum and oils obtained from bituminous minerals
34131 Liquefied propane and butane
41 Animal oils and fats
42 Fixed vegetable oils and fats
Table A.2: Analyzed countries with quarterly data
Code Country Period Source GDP Source ToT
ARG Argentina 1993q1 – 2015q2 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
AUS Australia 1990q1 – 2016q2 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
AUT Austria 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
BEL Belgium 1993q1 – 2016q2 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
BRA Brazil 1996q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
CAN Canada 1990q1 – 2016q2 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
CHE Switzerland 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD IFS/IMF
CHL Chile 1996q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
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Table A.2: (continued)
Code Country Period Source GDP Source ToT
COL Colombia 2000q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
CRI Costa Rica 1991q1 – 2016q1 OECD OECD
CZE Czech Republic 1996q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
DEU Germany 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD IFS/IMF
DNK Denmark 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD IFS/IMF
ESP Spain 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD IFS/IMF
EST Estonia 1995q1 – 2015q2 OECD OECD
FIN Finland 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
FRA France 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
GBR United Kingdom 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
GRC Greece 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD IFS/IMF
HKG Hong Kong 1990q1 – 2016q2 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
HUN Hungary 1995q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
IDN Indonesia 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
IND India 1996q2 – 2015q4 OECD IFS/IMF
IRL Ireland 1990q1 – 2014q4 OECD IFS/IMF
ISL Iceland 1997q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
ISR Israel 1990q1 – 2016q2 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
ITA Italy 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD IFS/IMF
JPN Japan 1990q1 – 2016q1 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
KOR South Korea 1990q1 – 2012q4 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
LTU Lithuania 1995q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
LUX Luxembourg 1995q1 – 2016q1 OECD OECD
LVA Latvia 1995q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
MAR Morocco 1990q1 – 2013q3 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
MEX Mexico 1993q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
NLD Netherlands 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
NOR Norway 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
NZL New Zealand 1990q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
PHL Philippines 1996q1 – 2006q4 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
POL Poland 1995q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
PRT Portugal 1995q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
SGP Singapore 1990q1 – 2015q2 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
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Table A.2: (continued)
Code Country Period Source GDP Source ToT
SVK Slovakia 1997q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
SVN Slovenia 1995q1 – 2016q2 OECD OECD
SWE Sweden 1990q1 – 2015q2 OECD IFS/IMF
THA Thailand 1993q1 – 2015q2 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
TUR Turkey 1991q1 – 2015q2 OECD IFS/IMF
USA United States 1990q1 – 2015q2 OECD OECD
ZAF South Africa 1990q1 – 2015q2 OECD OECD
Table A.3: Analyzed countries with annual data
Code Country Period Source GDP Source ToT
BGD Bangladesh 1990 – 2014 IFS/IMF WDI
BOL Bolivia 1990 – 2014 IFS/IMF WDI
CHN China 1990 – 2015 IFS/IMF WDI
JOR Jordan 1990 – 2011 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
MYS Malaysia 1990 – 2014 IFS/IMF WDI
PAK Pakistan 1990 – 2015 IFS/IMF IFS/IMF
PER Peru 1990 – 2014 IFS/IMF WDI
VEN Venezuela 1990 – 2013 IFS/IMF WDI
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Figure A.1: Standard deviation of terms of trade for PCX and non-PCX
Note: High-income countries (GNI per capita of US$12, 616 or more, according to the World Bank criterion)
are designated by a blue square, while low-income countries are red circles. Low-income countries for which
only annual data are available are depicted by an orange diamond. The dashed vertical line is the threshold
above which a country is a PCX.
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Figure A.2: Correlation between terms of trade and real GDP
Note: High-income countries (GNI per capita of US$12, 616 or more, according to the World Bank criterion)
are designated by a blue square, while low-income countries are red circles. Low-income countries for which
only annual data are available are depicted by an orange diamond. The dashed vertical line is the threshold
above which a country is a PCX.
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Solving for the Equilibrium
System of equations that characterize equilibria in case 1:
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System of two equations that characterize equilibria in case 2:
H1N =
w1H −Bpz
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We solved these systems using a Quasi-Newton fixed point algorithm. However, we
found a solution only for a range of parameter values. This is a general feature of increasing
returns to scale models that generate agglomeration and present multiplicity of equilibria.
When the stock of workers of each type is exogenous, finding the set of parameter values for
which there is one, multiple or no equilibria is easier. However, in the model of this paper
the education choice makes the stock of HE workers endogenous which complicates the task.
Further characterizing the equilibria is a priority in our research agenda.
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Additional Graphs
Case 2
Figure A.1: Specialization Patterns: Case 2
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Additional Tables
To provide a glimpse of changes in the European job and migration structure, columns 1
to 4 of Table A.1 show the employment shares of occupations, by migration status. Columns
5 to 8 show their percentage point changes between 1996 and 2010. We consider three
migration categories: native-born (Native), born in a EU-15 country different to the one of
current residency (EU15), and born outside the EU-15 bot working in one of our selected
countries (nonEU15). We pool employment for each group and occupation across our 15
European countries.
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Table A.1: Summary Statistics Occupations
ISCO Employment Share (2010) N2010 −N1996
code Pop Native FB-EU15 FB-Rest Pop Native FB-EU15 FB-Rest
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
High-Paying Occupations 38.16 39.74 41.64 23.50 17.58 21.82 46.47 -22.05
Corporate managers 12 4.80 4.98 6.74 2.73 8.79 12.79 36.73 -35.88
Physical, mathematical, and 21 4.14 4.29 4.84 2.61 51.04 59.24 52.93 -20.21
engineering professionals
Life science and health professionals 22 2.41 2.46 2.58 1.97 9.08 12.54 52.60 -35.46
Other professionals 24 5.08 5.27 6.94 2.99 40.97 47.52 107.77 -18.27
Managers of small enterprises 13 4.70 4.73 5.71 4.20 -16.10 -16.42 16.19 -17.15
Physical and engineering 31 4.41 4.65 4.37 2.38 15.70 20.74 13.68 -22.00
associate professionals
Other associate professionals 34 9.47 10.03 7.93 5.11 28.55 33.09 65.91 -1.17
Life science and health associate 32 3.14 3.34 2.51 1.51 16.30 22.94 43.25 -42.30
professionals
Medium-Paying Occupations 33.81 34.20 31.19 31.20 -20.64 -20.05 -27.93 -21.24
Stationary and plant related operators 81 1.14 1.18 1.01 0.80 -19.64 -15.20 -51.45 -51.20
Metal, machinery and related 72 4.56 4.70 3.44 3.64 -26.08 -24.29 -47.88 -28.01
trades workers
Drivers and mobile plant operators 83 4.59 4.60 3.20 4.88 -8.66 -9.03 -38.50 -0.18
Office clerks 41 9.71 10.30 7.64 5.19 -21.83 -18.79 -11.15 -42.21
Precision, handicraft, craft printing 73 0.38 0.38 0.44 0.36 -55.50 -56.22 -22.14 -48.90
printing and related trade workers
Extraction and building trades workers 71 6.23 5.77 9.50 9.35 -10.77 -15.47 -25.21 17.12
Customer sevice clerks 42 2.42 2.50 2.25 1.82 -2.49 -1.14 58.57 -6.55
Machine operators and assemblers 82 2.99 2.99 2.47 3.12 -30.62 -29.01 -46.88 -46.14
Other craft and related trades workers 74 1.79 1.78 1.24 2.03 -39.12 -40.69 -14.95 -21.89
Low-Paying Occupations 28.03 26.06 27.17 45.30 12.37 5.92 -3.97 49.79
Laborers in mining, construction, 93 2.82 2.52 1.75 5.68 -12.84 -20.89 -35.69 39.61
manufacturing and transport
Personal and protective service 51 11.45 11.09 10.50 14.81 18.11 14.10 15.60 56.72
workers
Models, salespersons, and 52 5.49 5.62 4.19 4.72 6.53 6.16 27.25 30.83
demonstrators
Sales and services elementary 91 8.27 6.83 10.73 20.09 20.56 6.65 -18.70 53.16
occupations
Note: Occupations are ordered by their mean wage across 10 European countries across all years, following
wage information in Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014). Columns 1 to 4 contain employment shares by
migrant status, pooled across countries. Columns 5 to 8 contain growth rates of employment shares from
1996-2010.
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Table A.2: ISCO-88 Major Groups and Skill Level
Major Group ISCO Education Level
1 Legislators and Managers 4
2 Professionals 4
3 Technicians and Associate professionals 3
4 Clerks 2
5 Service and Sales 2
6 Skilled Agricultural and Fishery 2
7 Craft and Related 2
8 Plant and Machine Operators 2
9 Elementary Occupations 1
